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INTRODUCTION

Professional responsibility ethicists posit a world in which
legal practice conflicts with lawyers' natural inclinations to act
morally.' Most conclude that lawyers cannot remain sane without sublimating objectivity to their systemic role in achieving
client ends.2 This Article challenges that perspective.
Part of the lawyer's routine professional life includes committing herself to client ends.' Yet the assumption that serving clients exacts a significant psychological toll on lawyers is misplaced. In practice, many lawyers happily surrender their personal ethics. Lawyers have obvious economic incentives to pursue client desires aggressively. Lawyers typically also feel comfortable allying themselves with clients whom they know personally and who may exert an influence on their well-being. Thus,
the lawyer's true challenge lies not in surviving internal moral
pressure, but rather in serving clients while simultaneously
maintaining an objective view of her responsibilities.'

1. See generally THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHIcS (Da-

vid Luban ed., 1983) [collection as a whole hereinafter THE GOOD LAWYER] (collection of essays by ethicists from a variety of disciplines). Most of these ethicists focus
on the concept of role-differentiation, the process by which lawyers make decisions
regarding appropriate conduct differently than laypersons would, based in part on
their conception of the role they must play to make the legal system effective. See,
e.g., David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra, at

83-84 (identifying tension between role-differentiated conduct and universal morality);
Richard Wasserstrom, Roles and Morality, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra, at 25-26

(describing role-differentiation in the context of other people's needs to consider role
in making moral decisions).
2. See, e.g., Alan Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System, in

THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 1, at 123 (describing the role-differentiated behavior
that a morally-justified legal system requires of lawyers); Virginia Held, The Division
of Moral Labor and the Role of the Lawyer, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 1, at

60, 63 (suggesting amended mandates of role-differentiation); cf. Andreas Eshete,
Does a Lawyer's CharacterMatter, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 1, at 270, 274-

79 (discussing damage to character resulting from role-differentiation); Gerald J.
Postema, Self-Image, Integrity, and Professional Responsibility, in THE GOOD LAWYER,

supra note 1, at 286, 289-94 (discussing strategies lawyers can use to reconcile roledifferentiated conduct with personal morality).
3. To avoid confusion, I refer to the primary lawyer under discussion in the
female gender. For balance, I treat the other actors in the process (e.g., clients and
adversaries) as male.
4. Charles Fried once described a lawyer as the client's "friend." See Charles
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The following pages consider the tension between client orientation and professionalism. Commentators already have described role-diffetentiation, 5 analyzed the effect of legal codes in
promoting role-differentiated behavior,6 and discussed the tendency of ethicists to overstate the impact of the codes.7 I take
their observations as a starting point. I both assume that there
are risks inherent in requiring lawyers to think only of their cli-

Fried, The Lawyer as Friend. The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation,
85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976) (contrasting the ethical duty to advance a client's interests
and the moral duty to advance the general good). The contrary is often true as well.
Lawyers want their clients to like them, not only for economic reasons (future business, referrals), but also because the lawyers come to know the clients and must
work with them-often quite closely. Sometimes lawyers socialize with clients. Even
if they do not, an atmosphere of mutual objectives and trust is more conducive to a
happy workplace than one in which the lawyer and client are at odds. See Donald
C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 95-111 (1993) (discussing psychological reasons why lawyers are disposed to like and trust clients).
5. See, e.g., THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 1; Gerald Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 64-70 (1980) (arguing that roledifferentiation weakens personal moral responsibility); Richard wasserstrom, Lawyers
as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 2-15 (1975) (discussing the impact of the attorney-client relationship on the lawyer's worldview).
6. The professional codes unquestionably incorporate the notion of role-differentiation as a fundamental principle. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
pmbl. (1993) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] ("v]irtually all difficult ethical problems
arise from conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system
and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright person while earning a
satisfactory living. The [Model Rules] prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts.");
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, pmbl. (1983) [hereinafter MODEL
CODE] (noting that [in fulfilling his professional responsibilities, a lawyer necessarily assumes various roles"). Scholars have suggested that, in effect, the codes lead
lawyers to avoid moral decisionmaking or to think only of the systemic effects of
their conduct. See, e.g., ALAN GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS 33 (1980) (arguing that because lawyers unthinkingly abide by principles in
the code, they fail to consider whether they should act in a different manner); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1088-91
[ethics] rules" and to exercise
(1988) (urging lawyers to set "aside parsing of ...
discretionary moral judgment); Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Codes:
Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of ProsecutorialEthics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
223, 257-65 (1993) (discussing the effect of different types of drafting approaches on
lawyers' adoption of particular roles).
7. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal
Ethics, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 1529, 1531-66 (criticizing "legal philosophers" for overemphasizing the codes' effects and showing that lawyers often role-differentiate despite
the mandate of the codes); Serena Stier, Legal Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 OHIO
ST. L.J. 551, 554 (1991) (same).
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ents' and recognize that most ethics codes do not demand such
an absolute approach.' My goal is to analyze how the ethos of
practice has developed to minimize lawyers' exercise of that
objective judgment which the codes allow. The analysis should
help identify steps the bar can take to counteract the trend.
Part I identifies the central relevance of objectivity to the
outstanding theories of lawyer professionalism. It considers the
extent to which client orientation is, and is not, consistent with
independent moral decisionmaking by lawyers. Part II traces the
changing emphasis the legal profession has placed on client
orientation. Part III links those changes to claims that professionalism has declined. It suggests that the historical pendulum
has swung from a situation in which lawyers failed to ally themselves with clients sufficiently to one in which lawyers avoid
making moral decisions and rely upon fictions concerning client
rights to achieve personal ends. Part IV concludes that although
ethics codes carefully safeguard the authority of lawyers to exercise discretion, the rules, legal training, and custom fail to emphasize adequately the lawyer's duty to act objectively. It proposes institutional steps that the legal profession should consider to rebalance the scales.

8. See generally Luban, supra note 1 (indicting systemic rationales as inadequate
justifications for pure client orientation); Murray Schwartz, The Professionalism and
Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669 (1978) (leveling similar criticisms
with respect to non-advocate attorneys). Even the strongest critics of moral
philosophers' attacks on the "standard conception" of lawyering agree that a pure
client-orientation would be inappropriate. See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 7, at 1539.
9. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyers and Client Fraud: They Still Don't Get
It, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 701, 701 (1993) (arguing that confidentiality rules in
codes should and do incorporate a range of discretion in a lawyer's exercise of zeal);
Schneyer, supra note 7, at 1550-55 (demonstrating the codes' limits on unrestrained
advocacy); Stier, supra note 7, at 554 (same). The strongest proponents of client orientation also agree that there should be limits. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN,
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 121-23 (1990) (arguing that a lawyer may put a
client that he knows will commit peijury on the stand, but may not help the client
perfect his testimony); id. at 71 (discussing other limits on zeal).
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I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OBJECTIVITY AND
PROFESSIONALISM

No term in the legal lexicon has been more abused than "professionalism."' Because lawyers typically are presumed to fit
the model of professionals, the term often is used to mean no

more than "to act as we want lawyers to act." This concept varies with the speaker.
Nevertheless, from the vast literature on the subject of professionalism, one can identify several core normative themes concerning the term's meaning." Virtually all of the themes encompass the notion that the lawyer's function includes a measure of objectivity in the implementation of legal skills, goals, or
practices. By objectivity, I refer to a sense of impartiality in
evaluating conflicting interests. In other words, objectivity is the
ability to distance oneself from personal and client desires in
order to evaluate the effect of potential actions on clients, third
parties, and the legal system. 2
10. See, e.g., Eugene A. Cook, Professionalism and the Practice of Law, 23 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 955, 956 (1992) ("Professionalism means different things to different
people."); Nancy J. Moore, Professionalism Reconsidered, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
773, 777-78 (discussing many meanings attributed to the term "professionalism");
Timothy P. Terrell & James Wildman, Rethinking Professionalism, 41 EMORY L.J.
403, 406 (1992) (noting the lack of uniformity in the use of the term and suggesting
that "our references to 'professionalism' may be nothing more than a sentimental
form of 'traditionalism").
11. Over the past two decades, hundreds of articles and speeches have focused on
the meaning of professionalism, its perceived "decline", and steps the bar should
take to improve it. Among the most important are CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS § 1.5 at 14-16 (1986) (summarizing shared characteristics of various
theories of professionalism); PROFITS AND PROFESSIONS; ESSAYS IN BUSINESS AND
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 3-73 (Wade L. Robison et al. eds., 1983) [hereinafter PROFITS]
(collection of essays on professionalism); Richard L. Abel, Taking Professionalism
Seriously, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 41, 41-63 (discussing values inherent in maintaining a profession). See generally Thomas D. Morgan, The Fall and Rise of Professionalism, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 451 (1985) (discussing history of the legal profession's
self-view); Kenneth L. Penegar, The Five Pillars of Professionalism, 49 U. PITT. L.
REV. 307 (1988) (arguing that the Model Code of Professional Responsibility reflects
an autonomous, individualistic norm for the profession that is at odds with other
conflicting norms of the profession). I distinguish these attempts to identify "normative" principles governing legal practice from other professionalism literature that
focuses on the organizational structure and makeup of the bar. See generally RICHARD ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989).

12. As Owen Fiss discusses in the context of judicial interpretation, objectivity
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Initially, characterizing an occupation as a profession assumes
something about the members and the subject matter of their
trade. One branch of the professionalism literature posits that
what distinguishes professionals from other laborers is lengthy
education, the accumulation of skills others cannot provide, and
an intellectual subject that typical laypersons cannot understand
or contend with, even assuming a reasonable term of training.
For proponents of this view, the core of professionalism is a
special competence to perform work on behalf of clients that
others cannot perform. 3
Something more is implicit in the skills approach. Plumbers
and car mechanics, for example, also possess training and abilities that nonmechanically-inclined persons cannot duplicate. The
significance of the lawyer's skills is that the lawyer is expected

"imparts a notion of impersonality"-a sense that results "can be measured against a
set of norms that transcend the particular vantage point" of the individual (here, the
client or lawyer) making the judgment. Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,
34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 744 (1982). The norms need not dictate each result but
should provide a constraining influence on the decisionmaker's ability to reach any
conclusion he or she wishes to reach. Id.
The objectivity I discuss should be distinguished from the "independence" of
lawyers that Robert Gordon discusses. See Robert Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988). Gordon focuses more on a political concept-the degree to which lawyers should maintain and act upon social views about the law and
objectives that are distinct from their clients' views. Id. at 2-30. Lawyers' practice
habits are relevant to Gordon's topic insofar as he calls for "purposive lawyering" or
"public-minded counseling" that furthers the public interest. Id. at 33, 34-48. I focus
on the smaller matters that arise in everyday practice and consider how lawyers
should exercise the professional detachment which Gordon assumes should be the
norm. See id. at 13 ("[L]awyers in [all] groups routinely urge upon each other . . . a
sort of detachment, aloofness, professional distance from the clients' ends.").
13. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STATEMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL LAWYERING SKILLS AND PROFESSIONAL VALUES 96-97 (1992) (identifying skills and training of
lawyers as keys to their professionalism); Kenneth Kipnis, ProfessionalResponsibility
and the Responsibility of Professions, in PROFITS, supra note 11, at 9, 14 (listing
characteristics of professions, including a claim to "maximal competence" because of
higher skill than other service-providers); Mary S. Coleman, Forces Undermine Standards of Professionalism, 61 MICH. B.J. 512, 512-13 (1982) (identifying "erudition"
and the ability to "translate" it into skill as the "essence" of a profession); James R.
Elkins, Ethics: Professionalism, Craft, and Failure, 73 KY. L.J. 937, 953-57 (1984)
(discussing professionalism in terms of "skill" and "craft"); Richard C. Kearney &
Chandan Sinha, Professionalism and Bureaucratic Responsiveness: Conflict or Compatibility?, 48 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 571, 572-73 (1988) (considering six proposed elements of a profession, including knowledge, training, and education).
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to exercise them on the client's behalf as a fiduciary, with only
limited client input (i.e., because the client cannot understand or
cope with the subject matter). Those who emphasize lawyers'
qualifications and training as the key to professionalism assume
that lawyers will exercise their skills objectively, both in the
sense of furthering the client's interests and in the sense of
making intelligent decisions regarding the strategies and tactics
that are most appropriate."
The same assumption pervades the dominant modern perspective on professionalism, which focuses on commercialism in legal
practice. This perspective takes one of three forms. First, some
observers assert that part of lawyers' professional obligation is
to subordinate personal financial interests in favor of clients'
need for legal services. 5 As a consequence, these observers conclude that lawyers should limit fees, accept unpaying clients,
and employ means that maximize client ends even when doing
so is unprofitable.16 A second, related argument centers upon

14. See, e.g., Lisa H. Newton, Professionalization:The Intractable Plurality of Values, in PROFITS, supra note 11, at 23 (stating that professionalism includes a commitment to the welfare of lay individuals in their charge); Morgan, supra note 11, at
451 (noting that professionalism encompasses the notion that laypersons are ordinarily not able to understand and evaluate the services performed); David A.J. Richards, Moral Theory, the Developmental Psychology of Ethical Autonomy and Professionalism, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 359, 359 (1981) (discussing professionals' "discretion in
risk-taking" on behalf of client).
15. See, e.g., E. Osborne Ayscue, Jr., Professionalism, 21 TENN. B.J. 17, 17 (1985)
(arguing that lawyers have a duty to subordinate financial reward to social responsibility); Reginald T. Hamner, Executive Director's Report: Professionalism and a
Shrinking Volunteer Base, 4 ALA. LAW. 127, 128 (1987) (defining a professional as
'one who puts in more than he takes out"); Robert P. Lawry, The Central Moral
Tradition of Lawyering, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 311, 331 (1990) ("[L]awyers are professionals, supposedly wedded to the idea that service to the public comes before their
own monetary gain."); Giandomenico Majone, Professionalism and Nonprofit Organizations, 8 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW 639, 640 (1984) (arguing that "altruism" is
part of professionalism); Ronald D. Rotunda, Lawyers and Professionalism: A Commentary on the Report of the American Bar Association Commission on Professionalism, 18 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1149, 1158 (1987) (defining professionalism by quoting
Roscoe Pound's belief that it encompasses "pursuing a learned art as a common
calling in the spirit of public service-no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood").
16. Jennifer G. Brown, Rethinking the "Practiceof Law," 41 EMORY L.J. 451, 45758 (1992) (arguing that professionalism includes the duty to represent low income
clients); Harry L. Carrico, The New Professionalism, 62 N.Y. ST. B.J. 11, 12 (1990)
(asserting that professionalism means that lawyers should devote less time to earn-
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the delivery of pro bono services. Some states have adopted
ethics rules requiring lawyers to donate a minimum number of
hours to public service. 7 Many commentators suggest that this
pro bono obligation is part and parcel of being a member of a
profession." Third, commercial practices of lawyers, such as
advertising, solicitation, and the creation of ancillary businesses,
have drawn criticism as demeaning lawyers and therefore undermining society's trust in them. 9

ing money and more to "the public good"); Monroe H. Freedman, Professionalism in
the American Adversary System, 41 EMORY L.J. 467, 470 (1992) (defining professionalism as serving client ends and assuming that "the fact that the lawyer is earning
a living . . . is immaterial"); Steven Lubet, ProfessionalismRevisited, 42 EMORY L.J.
197, 202, 207-08 (1993) (arguing that the benefits the profession receives from its
grant of monopoly and from the nature of the system require the profession to help
assure quality legal services throughout the legal system); Justin A. Stanley, Professionalism and Commercialism, 50 MONT. L. REV. 1, 5 (1989) (asserting that accumulation of money is secondary to the professional lawyer).
17. See, e.g., FLA. B.R. 4-6.1 (1994) (requiring 20 hours of public interest legal
services at no or reduced fees or a donation of $350 to a legal aid organization;
noting that "failure to fulfill one's professional responsibility . . . will not subject a
lawyer to discipline," but that the bar will keep records of lawyers who have not
complied); COMMITTEE TO IMPROVE THE AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SERVICES, FINAL
REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (April 1990) (pending
proposal to amend New York's rules to require pro bono work by all lawyers); see
also In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar--3.1(a) and Rules of
Judicial Admin.-2.065 (Legal Aid), 598 So. 2d 41, 49 (Fla. 1992) (explaining the
Florida plan); Kim Schimenti, Pro Choice for Lawyers in a Revised Pro Bono System,
23 SETON HALL L. REV. 641, 667 n.128 (1993) (describing New York plan's history,
its deferred implementation, and alternative pending proposals). Compare MODEL
RULES Rule 6.1 (1993) (targeting 50 hours of public service and contributions to
legal assistance for the poor) with MODEL RULES Rule 6.1 (1983) ("A lawyer should
render public interest legal service.").
18. Abel, supra note 11, at 51 (proposing strict and significant pro bono requirements for all lawyers); Richard C. Baldwin, "Rethinking Professionalism"-and then
Living It!, 41 EMORY L.J. 433, 436-50 (1992); Brown, supra note 16, at 452-65; Monroe H. Freedman, Professionalism in the American Adversary System, 41 EMORY L.J.
467, 470 (1992); Jack L. Sammons, Jr. & Linda H. Edwards, Honoring the Law in
Communities of Force: Terrel [sic] and Wildman's Teleology of Practice, 41 EMORY
L.J. 489, 511-12 (1992). But see Terrell & Wildman, supra note 10, at 420-22 (arguing that lawyers have no obligation to serve the poor).
19. N. Lee Cooper, Opening Statement, 12 LITIG., Fall 1985, at 1, 70 (asserting
that when lawyers advertise, they weaken their ability to refuse representation and
remain independent); Patrick G. Emmanuel, Professionalism-Let's Keep it Alive, 60
FLA. B.J., Feb. 1986, at 4 (suggesting that advertising and marketing of legal services demeans the profession); Francis I. Parker, Whither Professionalism, 34 N.C. ST.
B.Q. 20 (Fall 1987) (arguing that professionals should not compete among them-
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Central to the focus on commercialism is the belief that the
free market does not order lawyers' behavior in a satisfactory
way. Lawyers should not act as normal businessmen or serviceproviders maximizing their own interests, but rather should
respond to higher societal values that transcend economics. This
theory necessarily assumes that lawyers can identify the higher
values despite conflicting self-interest. In other words, the theory assumes that lawyers can analyze impartially which of their
actions will maximize society's interests, however defined, and
can act in accordance with those interests. 0 Again, lawyer objectivity is critical to the theory.
The relevance of objectivity to professionalism is even more
obvious with respect to two other schools of thought that define
professionalism with reference to the regulation of lawyers. One
school posits that an essential element of professionalism is that
an occupation must regulate itself fairly, as the bar regulates
lawyers." To the extent this approach incorporates the idea
that self-regulation includes consideration of interests other
than those of the members of the profession (e.g., societal interests, client interests), the theory assumes that lawyers can asselves); cf William E. Hornsby, Jr., Professionalism-What'sAdvertising Got To Do
With It?, PROF. LAW., Feb. 1995, at 2, 27 (questioning whether legal advertising significantly affects the profession's image).
20. See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE 177
(1966) (arguing for more client participation in decisionmaking but acknowledging
that it would reduce the "ability [lawyers] now have to restrain clients from taking
immoral, illegal, or simply unfortunate actions"); Frederick A. Elliston, Ethics, Professionalism and the Practice of Law, 16 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 529, 532-33 (1984) (arguing
for the need to develop the conscience of the lawyers so that they can fulfill their
prescribed role); Parker, supra note 19, at 21 (stating that professional service includes lawyers committing themselves to an ideal of "public service"); Terrell &
Wildman, supra note 10, at 414 (identifying the function of professionalism as
"reach[ing] beyond the basic and uninspiring values enforced by the codes, and
demonstrat[ing] that lawyer's share, or ought to share, higher, more ambitious moral
aspirations"); cf. Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A
Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 617-18 (noting
that a lawyer's judgment of morality may not be better than a client's).
21. See, e.g., James M. Dolliver, Law as a Profession: Will it Survive?, 26 GONZ.
L. REv. 267, 268 (1990-91) (noting traditional view that a profession is a body whose
members have their own system of internal discipline and are relatively free from
lay evaluation and control); Elliston, supra note 20, at 532 (noting the importance of
self-regulation in identifying a profession); Richards, supra note 14, at 359 (discussing the importance of self-regulation to traditional theories of professionalism).
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sess and implement third-party values.2 2
The second regulatory school of thought explicitly assumes
objectivity. It defines professionals as members of an occupation
that maintains standards or written codes and, pursuant to
these standards or codes, pursues (or internalizes) societallybeneficial ideals.23 Tautologically, this approach requires lawyers to order their conduct with reference to some ascertainable
standard rather than through instinct or pursuit of selfish interests.
Interestingly, scholars who define professionalism in a way
contrary to the regulatory schools also assume that lawyers will
maintain objectivity toward legal practice. These scholars suggest that professional lawyering requires an emphasis on personal, uncodified standards of morality. They identify lawyer
self-awareness and introspection as avenues for determining
appropriate behavior.2 4 They reject total reliance on ethics rules

22. See, e.g., Edward J. Eberle, Three Foundations of Legal Ethics: Autonomy,
Community, and Morality, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 89, 91 (1993) ("As professionals,
lawyers owe duties to clients, society, and conscience."); Kearney & Sinha, supra
note 13, at 571 (characterizing professionalism as including self-regulation and "autonomy . . . restrained by responsibility"); Penegar, supra note 11, at 310-11 (discussing "five pillars" of lawyer self-regulation).
23. See, e.g., Abel, supra note 11, at 62-63 (noting that one factor separating professions from occupations is the willingness to strive for professional ideals); Harold
G. Clarke, The Rewards of Professionalism, PROF. LAW., Aug. 1991, at 1, 3 (asserting
that professionalism is a "higher standard" and that lawyers should adhere to it for
loftier reasons than the mere threat of sanction); Michael Davis, Professional Means
Putting Your Profession First, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 341, 343 (1988) (arguing that
professionalism includes a commitment to act in accordance with the profession's
code of ethics); cf Elkins, supra note 13, at 947 (arguing that the term "professionalism" enables lawyers to pay lip service to lofty ideals while acting in their own
self-interests).
24. See, e.g., Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, in
PROFITS, supra note 11, at 41 (arguing that lawyers must bridge personal and professional morality by exercising practical judgment); John J. Flynn, Professional Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty to Self, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 429, 444 (asserting the importance of lawyer introspection); Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics and the Good
Client, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 319, 328 (1987) (stating that a good lawyer "may need
to insist . . . on the little, little area where . . . he will have to decide for himself
whether he will follow his friend [the client]"); William H. Simon, The Ideology of
Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 130
(proposing "non-professional advocacy" through which lawyers must present their
personal ethics to clients); Zacharias, supra note 6, at 237 (discussing introspection
as an aspect of professional regulation); cf Jack L. Sammons, The Professionalism
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precisely because overemphasis of the rules may inhibit' lawyers
from implementing independent principles." Central to this
theory is the notion that lawyers must view situations and relationships from all perspectives and evaluate the situations on an
objective moral basis.26
In the last decade, one other approach to professionalism has
gathered support, particularly among nonacademics. Proponents
of this approach consider "civility" within the bar as the core of
professionalism.27 For them, the perceived decline in professionalism stems from an increase in "hardball" tactics and a decrease in the respect with which lawyers treat each other, the
courts, and clients.2" Interpreted as an observation regarding

Movement: The Problems Defined, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POLY 269, 300

(1993) ("The ethic of our practice is chiefly an ethic of character.").
25. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 6, at 1083-84 (arguing that lawyers must exercise
discretion in making ethical decisions); Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 8 (discussing
the effect of rules on a lawyer's willingness to exercise independent judgment); cf.
John Leubsdorf, Three Models of Professional Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1021,
1045-52 (1988) (noting the emerging branch of scholarship that calls upon lawyers
"to stop hiding behind rules, roles, and institutions, and to take responsibility for
their actions") and authorities cited therein.
26. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 12, at 11-30 (arguing that lawyers outside of the
criminal context do, and should, exercise independent judgment); Simon, supra note
6, at 1140-43 (arguing that lawyers must consider societal interests in applying
strict confidentiality rules).
27. See, e.g., Marvin E. Aspen, The Search for Renewed Civility in Litigation, 28
VAL. U. L. REV. 513, 514 (1994) (characterizing a decline in civility as "the erosion
of professionalism in attorney relationships"); Clarke, supra note 23, at 6 ("Lawyers
can be zealous in their advocacy without being . . . discourteous and uncivil.");
Coleman, supra note 13, at 512 (a profession should be characterized by the absence
of "secretiveness" from the community and "snobbishness"); Cook, supra note 10, at
957 ("IP]rofessionalism is synonymous with common courtesy, civility and the Golden
Rule."); Michael H. Dettmer, Observations on Professionalism, 68 MICH. B.J. 842, 842
(1989) (lawyers should "act with civility"); Alex S. Keller, Professionalism: Where Has
it Gone?, 1985 COLO. LAW. 1383, 1384-85 (emphasizing the importance of courtesy
and respect in practice); cf William A. Brewer III & Francis B. Marjorie, One Year
After Dondi: Time to Get Back to Litigating?, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 833, 833 n.1 (1990)
(listing various codes and "creeds" of civility adopted by local bar associations); Brent
E. Dickson & Julia B. Jackson, Renewing Lawyer Civility, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 531
(1994) (discussing various projects to improve civility).
28. See, e.g., Peter M. Brown, Narcissism, Manners, and Morals: Can Grace and
Collegiality be Salvaged?, 13 LITIG., Winter 1987, at 17 (decrying the decline in civility); John C. Buchanan, The Demise of Legal Professionalism: Accepting Responsibility and Impleinenting Change, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 563, 567-69 (1994) (attributing
decline in professionalism to decline in civility, as exemplified by lawyers' hardball
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etiquette, this approach has little moral force. When interpreted
in the context of the practice tactics it addresses, however, the
approach has substance. In calling upon lawyers to restrain
their tactics-even when they serve some purpose (e.g., wearing
down the adversary)-proponents of civility again are positing
that lawyers should act with reference to a standard of conduct
that does not maximize results."- In other words, lawyers must
step back and view their strategies objectively, with reference to
some, undefined, third-party values.
I have not discussed additional theories that define professionalism on the basis of the prestige or status that members of the
occupation enjoy, because I assume that the prestige or status
must derive from some source." I also have postponed consideration of theories that define professionals as those who gauge
their conduct solely by client interests." At this stage, my point
simply is to identify the key role that objectivity plays ii the
popular theories of professionalism. Most of these theories encompass an image of lawyers who remain independent from
personal interests and uninformed client requests and who exercise skill with reference to standards and values that they alone
are expected to understand.
II. THE HISTORY OF CLIENT ORIENTATION AS AN ASPECT OF
PROFESSIONALISM

The concept of professionalism has existed as long as the bar
has been organized. Our visualization of early professionals is

tactics); Cook, supra note 10, at 979 (attributing decline of professionalism to an
increase in "Rambo" tactics and proposing new standards of civility to limit such
tactics); Dettmer, supra note 27, at 842 (arguing that lawyers should pursue the
truth-seeking process, not just the goal of winning).
29. See Cook, supra note 10, at 982-95, 999 (discussing bars' reactions to the
decline in civility and advocating rules similar to those of Texas to limit result-maximizing conduct) and authorities cited therein.
30. Among the commentators that refer to prestige or status as a defining characteristic of a profession are WOLFRAM, supra note 11, § 1.5 at 15; Newton, supra note
14, at 31-32.
31. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 16, at 470-72 (discussing role-differentiation as
an aspect of professionalism); Kenneth L. Penegar, The Professional Project: A Response to Terrell and Wildman, 41 EMoRY L.J. 473, 473-74 (1992) (noting that roledifferentiated morality is a characteristic of all professions).
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an idealized image: Abraham Lincoln, the repository of wisdom
and model of civility;32 Alexander Hamilton and John Adams,
the guardians of justice against public opinion.3" However, as
the bar took shape as a guild, it began to develop more concrete
norms for lawyers that ultimately found their way into professional codes.34
From the beginning, professional standards evinced an ambivalence between client orientation and a desire to maintain independent judgement. The classic early statement of the lawyer's
function is Lord Brougham's: the lawyer "knows but one person
in all the world, and that person is his client."35 As Russell
Pearce has pointed out, however, the bar never accepted
Brougham's principle as an absolute.3 6 Hoffman's Resolutions
and Sharswood's lectures, the precursors of the first professional
codes, emphasized loyalty to clients,3 7 but at the same time de32. See Emanuel Hertz, Book Review, 11 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 354, 358 (1937)
(lauding Lincoln's "human sympathy, his humor, his lawyer-like caution, his common
sense, his fairness to opponents, his dislike of arbitrary rule, his willingness to take
the people into his confidence and to set forth the reasons for unusual measures.").
Lincoln's place in the history of law derives in part from his qualities as a human
being, rather than from his legal ability. In a law lecture in 1850, he said: "Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you can. Point out
to them the nominal winner is often a real loser-in fees, expenses, and waste of
time. As a peacemaker the lawyer has superior opportunity of being a good man.
There will still be business enough .

. . ."

Jerome J. Shestack, Abe Lincoln as a

Lawyer, 68 FLA. B.J., April 1994, at 78.
33. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, The Zenger Case: Prototype of a Political Trial, in
AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS, 21, 21-36 (Michal R. Belknap ed., 1981) (describing
Hamilton's defense of Peter Zenger on criminal libel charges); Daniel J. Kornstein,
John Adams and the Boston Massacre, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 15, 1984, at 2 (describing
John Adams' representation of British soldiers charged with killing three Bostonians
in the Boston Massacre as an "unforgettable example of the lawyer's professional
duty to represent unpopular clients").
34. Alabama adopted the first codified set of professional standards in 1887. Craig
Enoch, Incivility in the Legal System? Maybe it's the Rules, 47 SMU L. REV. 199,
210 (1994). In 1908, the ABA followed suit by adopting the Canons of Ethics, a
largely generalized and hortatory set of norms. The ABA did not promulgate concrete, enforceable rules until the 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility. For discussions of the history of professional regulation, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The
Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1249-60 (1991); Zacharias, supra note 6,
at 223-24.
35. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 54 (1988).
36. Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics
Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 241-42 (1992).
37. DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDIES 758 (1836) ("To my clients I
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lineated important areas in which lawyers were to remain true
to their objective moral beliefs.3" The initial professional codes,
Alabama's 1887 formulation and the 1908 ABA Canons, incorporated this tension between extreme client orientation and objectivity." In the early years of the organized bar, lawyers were
governed by loose standards that left difficult ethical and tactical dilemmas to discretion and individual conscience.4"
As the bar expanded, became more organized, and exerted
more influence on American society in the early twentieth century, perceptions of the bar began to change. The public paradigm
moved from the poor country lawyer-Abe Lincoln-to the rich,
patrician elite. 4 ' Within the bar, the number of lawyers entering the profession exploded." Although this increase is partly
attributable to economic forces,"3 equally relevant were postwill be faithful; and in their causes zealous and industrious."); GEORGE SHARSWOOD,
AN ESSAY; PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 76-125 (1854) (stressing the "importance" of lawyers
and "loyalty" to clients).
38. See, e.g., HOFFMAN, supra note 37, at 752 ("I will never permit professional
zeal to carry me beyond the limits of sobriety and decorum"); SHARSWOOD, supra
note 37, at 62-63 (stressing lawyer's need to maintain 'dignity" and 'respect").
39. See L. RAY PATTERSON, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 5 (2d ed. 1984) (describing the history of early legal ethics codes). Compare
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 15 (1908) ("The lawyer owes 'entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance of his rights'") with
Canon 16 ("A lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do.") and Canon
18 ("A lawyer should always treat adverse witnesses and suitors with fairness and
due consideration.").
40. See Pearce, supra note 36, at 261-72 (describing Sharswood's code and the
1908 Canons of Ethics).
41. See David R. Papke, The Legal Profession and its Ethical Responsibilities: A
History, in ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 29, 36 (Michael Davis & Frederick
Elliston eds., 1986) [collection as a whole hereinafter ETHICS] (describing the contrast
between the elite "Wall Street" Bar on one hand and solo practitioners and the
"ethnic bar" on the other). Government funded legal services were not available in
the early twentieth century, so lawyers tended to associate only with those who
could afford representation. See, e.g., LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, The Opportunity in the
Law, in BUSINESS-A PROFESSION 321 (1914) (decrying the bar's aligning too much
with corporate America and too little with "the people"); Harlan F. Stone, The Public
Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1934) (arguing that the bar had become loyal only to business); cf ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
245 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds., George Lawrence, trans. 1966) (noting early the
"aristocratic" leanings of American lawyers).
42. Papke, supra note 41, at 41.
43. The post-war economic expansion undoubtedly created economic opportunities
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New Deal and post-World War II idealism and the anticipation
that the law would play a major role in reforming America's
ills." Both in the public's eyes and in the eyes of new niembers
of the bar, lawyers increasingly had become instruments of the
upper class, used to maintain dominance over the poor.4 5
The bar's elite relied upon professional self-regulation to
maintain their status as "bar leaders" and to control the direction of the profession.4 6 Their response to the declining image of
lawyers was to emphasize pro bono activities and the primacy of
clients.4 7 Born was the public service ideal that most codes now
for more lawyers.
44. See, e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN MODERN AIERICA 6 (1972) (describing post-New Deal history); Papke,
supra note 41, at 41 (describing development of the bar and the professional selfcriticism of civil rights lawyers in the post-New Deal and civil rights eras). Thus, it

is during this period that organizations such as the NAACP and the ACLU began to
focus on lawsuits as the primary means of achieving reform in the areas of civil
rights and individual liberties. See generally AUERBACH, supra, at 263-68 (describing
change in attitudes toward the law during the civil rights movement); RICHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 139-72 (1976) (describing the evolution of the NAACP's

litigation strategy in the 1930s and 1940s).
45. See, e.g., AUERBACH, supra note 44, at 281-82 (noting the perception that "only
corporate clients and wealthy individuals were assured of access to lawyers");
REGINALD H. SMITH, JUSTICE AND

THE POOR 12

(3d ed. 1972) (arguing that

"[dlifferences in the ability of the classes to use the machinery of the law" was leading to "disparity between the rights of classes in the law itself"); Ferdinand
Lundberg, The Priesthood of the Law, 1939 HARPER'S MAG., 515, 526 (arguing that
the legal system has perpetuated economic and social injustice because lawyers are
allied with the sources of "economic power", leaving most injured parties with no
redress).
46. See, e.g., AUERBACH, supra note 44, at 6 ("A weakened professional elite . . .
tacitly acceded to a quid pro quo: some outsiders finally would be admitted to elite
positions within the professional structure in return for their loyalty to dominant
professional values."); cf Albert P. Blaustein, What Do Laymen Think of Lawyers?
Polls Show the Need for Better Public Relations, 38 A.B.A. J. 39, 41 (1952) (noting
profession's responses to Reginald Heber Smith's criticisms of the bar, calling upon
lawyers to "clean house," and describing the bar's attempts to serve the public with
'committees on professional ethics and grievances, law reform, legal aid and lawyer
reference plans"); O.A. Byington, Lo! The Poor Lawyer!, IOWA ST. B. ASS'N 73 (1927)
(responding to the declining image of attorneys by stressing the need for educating
the public that the lawyers were not to be associated with the criminality of their
clients); Guy A. Thompson, Relationships and Responsibilities of the Legal Profession,
18 A.B.A. J. 631, 632-34 (1932) (ABA president noting the declining public image
and calling upon the profession to embark upon an "organized, systematic, continuous and universal effort" to "discharge the duties that we owe [to the public] as
members of a great profession.").
47. Of course, these notions were not original. See, e.g., Pearce, supra note 36, at

1318

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1303

include" and that many commentators today identify as
professionalism's core:4 9 lawyers should serve the poor at no
cost, help make legal services widely available, and zealously
protect each individual's interests.
A related response stemmed from a new judicial emphasis on
individual rights and due process, particularly in criminal matters. As the Warren Court identified and protected constitutional
rights through the 1950s and 1960s,5" and as the liberal press
gave increasing coverage to that trend, the bar reevaluated its
own role. The due process model of criminal litigation highlighted the importance of lawyers in helping clients vindicate their
rights. Lawyers came to view client orientation as the key to
their role. The category of legal "heroes" continued to include
lawyers who defended innocent clients,5 but also extended to
those52who vindicated client rights regardless of their own client's
guilt.
262-63 (discussing Sharswood's view that "'the time will never come . . . when a
poor man with an honest cause, though without a fee, cannot obtain the services of
honorable counsel'") and authorities cited therein; see also ANTHONY T. KRONMAN,
THE LOST LAWYER 11-52 (1993) (discussing changes in lawyers' attitudes over time).
48. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 6.1 (1993) (targeting 50 hours of public service
and financial contributions to legal assistance for the poor); MODEL RULES Rule 6.1
(1983) ("A lawyer should render public service."); MODEL CODE EC 2-25 (1983) ("Every lawyer . . . should find time to participate in serving the disadvantaged."); see
also AUERBACH, supra note 44, at 286 (describing the bar's new emphasis on rights
of access to legal services).
49. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, EQUAL JUSTICE 5-6 (1971) (discussing the
Court's effect in producing "a profound change in the mechanics of our political democracy and the revolution in criminal justice" and praising the Court for bringing
"legal rules into consonance with the human reality to which they purport to respond"); LUTHER A. HUSTON, PATHWAY TO JUDGMENT: A STUDY OF EARL WARREN
155-66 (1966) (praising the Warren Court's contributions to the protection of individual rights in the criminal context); JOHN D. WEAVER, WARREN: THE MAN, THE
COURT, THE ERA 219-38 (1967) (glorifying the Warren Court's contribution to criminal procedure); Robert B. McKay, Reapportionment: Success Story of the Warren
Court, in THE WARREN COURT: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 32-34 (Richard H. Sayler et al.,
eds., 1968) (noting the unique importance of Supreme Court decisions from 1953 to
1968 and lauding the Court for speaking "the conscience of the majority" and for
reasserting "the values of the open society for which the Constitution stands").
51. See, e.g., ROBERT BARTELS, BENEFIT OF LAW: THE MURDER CASE OF ERNEST
TRIPLETT (1988) (describing vindication of innocent alleged child molestor/murderer);
DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 81-82 (1979)
(describing zealous representation by unpaid counsel on behalf of the Scottsboro five).
52. See ATORNEY FOR THE DAMNED: CLARENCE DARROW IN HIS OWN WORDS (Ar-
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Entering the 1970s, therefore, we see the full development of
a theoi-y of lawyering that emphasizes client rights and client
desires over lawyers' independent assessments of what cases
and tactics are good or just.5 3 Monroe Freedman led the intellectual development of this theory, characterizing client orientation as a constitutional guarantee and as an essential element in
upholding the dignity of individuals.5 4 Notwithstanding schol-

thur Weinberg ed., 1957) (popularizing in retrospect the unpopular causes represented by Clarence Darrow); Terrell & Wildman, supra note 10, at 415 (discussing development of "rights-consciousness" among members of the public and the bar).
Thus, for example, Anthony Lewis' acclaimed account of Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (recognizing indigent criminal defendants' right to counsel),
lionized Abe Fortas for his argument for an indigent criminal defendant's right to
counsel. Fortas, however, did not vindicate Gideon's innocence, just his right to counsel. Fortas did not even represent Gideon at the subsequent retrial because Gideon
did not want Fortas as his lawyer. See ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964).
53. I say "full development" because the general notion of client-oriented lawyering
had proponents as early as the nineteenth century. See Pearce, supra note 36, at
257-58.
54. FREEDMAN, supra note 9, at 54 (quoting Justice William J. Brennan and asserting that the Sixth Amendment guarantees that "I[tihe role of the defense lawyer
should be above all to function as the instrument and defender of the client's autonomy and dignity in all phases of the criminal process'"); Monroe H. Freedman, Ethical Ends and Ethical Means, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 55-56 (1991) [hereinafter Freedman,
Ethical Ends] ("I think of lawyers' ethics as rooted in the Bill of Rights as expressed
in our constitutionalized adversary system."); cf. Jay S. Silver, Professionalism and
the Hidden Assault on the Adversarial Process, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 857-66 (1994)
(arguing, somewhat hysterically, that modern attempts to reconceptualize professionalism reflect a hidden assault on constitutionally-required adversarial processes that
protect criminal defendants' rights).
Commentators and the bar have sometimes mischaracterized Freedman and his
philosophy. See id., at 57 (accusing William Simon of misstating his views). Freedman emphasizes the importance of client-oriented lawyering, particularly in criminal
practice. However, he also expects lawyers to engage in introspection and to take
seriously their responsibility to engage in objective, moral decisionmaking. Thus,
Freedman encourages lawyers to reject cases in which the objectives offend the lawyers. FREEDMAN, supra note 9, at 68 ('[Olne of the most important considerations in
making a decision to accept or reject a client is that the lawyer, in representing the
client, might be required to use tactics that the lawyer finds offensive."); see also
Monroe H. Freedman, Legal Ethics and the Suffering Client, 36 CATH. U. L. REV.
331, 332 (1987) [hereinafter Freedman, Suffering Client] ("A lawyer who finds a
potential client or cause to be morally offensive can simply decline the retainer.");
Monroe H. Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a Professional System, 27 CATH U.
L. REV. 191, 204 (1977) [hereinafter Freedman, Personal Responsibility] (asserting
that lawyers act "morally" in helping clients and may exercise their personal judgment in choosing clients). He also discourages rationalization by lawyers considering
participation in unlawful or fraudulent conduct. FREEDMAN, supra note 9, at Bi
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arly disapproval of the extremes of Freedman's position,55 his
model became mainstream. 6 Defense lawyers, in particular,
routinely put into practice Freedman's attitudes, regardless of
the mandates of the state professional codes governing their behavior.5 7

(arguing that it is "disingenuous and morally irresponsible to say that lawyers never
know the truth about our clients' cases"). Perhaps most importantly, Freedman admonishes lawyers to discuss moral issues with clients in the hope that the clients
themselves will do the right thing. Freedman, Ethical Ends, supra, at 56.
55. See, e.g., David G. Bress, Professional Ethics in Criminal Trials: A View of
Defense Counsel's Responsibility, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1493, 1494-97 (1966) (disagreeing
with Freedman's belief that a lawyer's duty to have his client acquitted is paramount to his or her obligation to the court, and emphasizing the lawyer's obligations
to use "fair and honorable" means in defending a client); Teresa S. Collett, Understanding Freedman's Ethics, 33 ARiz. L. REV. 455, 456 (1991) (questioning
Freedman's "elevat[ing] client service above almost all other amoral considerations.");
Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for the Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PENN. L.
REV. 1031, 1055 (1975) (questioning whether counsel's paramount commitment should
be to the discovery of truth or to the advancement of clients' interests); John T.
Noonan, Jr., The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH. L.
REV. 1485, 1486-89 (1965) (criticizing Freedman's model as overemphasizing the
"battle" aspects of trials); Ronald D. Rotunda, Book Review, 89 HARV. L. REV. 622,
623 (1976) (criticizing "Freedman's overly broad view of the need for confidentiality
and zeal"); Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences
to Prevent Harm, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1091, 1126 n.190 (1985) (arguing that Freedman
"missed" the point in insisting that the Fifth Amendment prohibits an attorney from
revealing a client's peijury in all contexts).
56. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 75 (1980) (noting that in
practice lawyers "are engaged very often in helping to obstruct and divert the search
for truth" and that "lawyers not infrequently help clients to lie"); KENNETH MANN,
DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 103, 120-24 (1985) (describing client-oriented approach of white-collar defense attorneys); Addison M. Bowman, Standards of Conduct
for Prosecution and Defense Personnel: An Attorney's Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 28,
30 (1966) (adopting Freedman's view on the need to test the prosecution's case, even
to the extent of discrediting truthful and credible witnesses); Stephen L. Pepper, The
Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 617 (justifying strict client orientation on the basis of a
broad societal interest in preserving client autonomy); Stier, supra note 7, at 553
(noting practitioners' common acceptance of role-differentiation theory); Ralph J.
Temple, Monroe Freedman and Legal Ethics: A Prophet in His Own Time, 13 J.
LEGAL PROF. 233, 233 (1988) ("[tlhose who read [Freedman's 1975] book and recognize how contemporary its ideas have become in light of their past unacceptability
will share this reviewer's pleasure in accounting Monroe Freedman a prophet with
honor in his own time.") (quoting Jerry Cohen, Book Review, 27 HARV. L. SCH.
BULL., Winter 1977, at 9).
57. See MANN, supra note 56, at 8 ("[Tlhere are many opportunities for information control, and experienced [defense] attorneys have developed special skills for

1995]

PROFESSIONALISM AND CLIENT INTERESTS

1321

The ABA adopted a new code, the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, that retained some of the Canons' preferences for
professional objectivity58 but was nevertheless susceptible to an
interpretation that client loyalty should be the dominant professional creed. The Model Code treated attorney-client confidentiality as virtually absolute and elevated the requirement of zealous advocacy to a canonical level.59 The changes were popular;
the Model Code was adopted almost unanimously, with little
criticism from scholars and the press. For a brief period from the
1950s through the early 1970s, society perceived lawyers as
heroes as often as villains. Lawyers were the architects of social
justice-as in Brown v. Board, of Education" and Baker v.
Carr--andthe guardians of civil liberties through the Warren
Court decisions that they helped to promote.62 The public perception of lawyers as "professionals" seemed secure.
What happened, then, to produce the modern notion that
professionalism again has declined? First, the criminal justice
system seems to have broken down. By all accounts, the courts
are incapable of dealing with the increasing crime rate. 3 More-

exploiting them.").
Freedman was not the first to propose or implement a client-oriented ethos. I
do not mean to suggest that his work created the bar's current client-oriented mentality. However, by justifying role-differentiation and giving it respectability, Freedman has strongly influenced the focus of professional responsibility theory and the
bar's vision of acceptable approaches to practice.
58. See, e.g., MODEL CODE Canon 5 ("A lawyer should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client") and accompanying ethical considerations and
disciplinary rules; MODEL CODE DR 7-102 (listing unacceptable conduct when representing clients).
59. See MODEL CODE DR 4-101(B) (1) ("Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C),
a lawyer shall not knowingly reveal a confidence or secret of his client."); MODEL
CODE Canon 7 (establishing duty of zealous representation). However, the code does
suggest that some limits to client-orientation should be honored. E.g., MODEL CODE
DR 4-101(C) (establishing limited exceptions to confidentiality rules); MODEL CODE
EC 7-10 (noting that duties to third parties may exist concurrently with the duty of
zeal).
60. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding unconstitutional state-sponsored school segregation).
61. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (establishing the principle of one person, one vote).
62. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 52, at 169-74 (describing Abe Fortas' efforts to
establish criminal defendants' right to counsel); KLUGER, supra note 44, at 126-29
(examining the role lawyers played in bringing about the decision in Brown).
63. See, e.g., RICHARD NEELY, HoW CouRTs GOVERN AMERICA 145-89 (1981) (dis-

1322

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1303

over, unlike in the Warren Court period when lawyers and
courts established core rights of defendants," modern cases
address the fine-tuning of those rights.6 5 When defendants win,
lawyers no longer are exalted for vindicating basic rights, but
rather are blamed for contributing to a system in which legal
technicalities triumph over substance. 6 Lawyers who go to the

cussing the social impact of court decisions involving criminal law reform); Jay
Folberg et al., Use of ADR in California Courts: Findings and Proposals, 26 U.S.F.
L. REV. 343, 348 (1992) (discussing the California courts' inability to deal with the
dramatic increase in criminal cases which consume a disproportionate amount of judicial resources); Final Report to Honorable Thomas C. Platt, Chief Judge: The Causes of Unnecessary Delay and Expense in Civil Litigation in the Eastern District of
New York, 142 F.R.D. 185, 189 (1992) (critically noting the dominating and "burgeoning" criminal docket created by the national commitment to federalizing an increasing variety of crimes); cf Harry T. Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived
'Bureaucracy' of the Federal Courts: A Causation-BasedApproach to the Search for
Appropriate Remedies, 68 IOWA L. REV. 871, 878 (1983) (noting that courts of appeal
have coped with increases in their criminal workload by reducing or eliminating oral
argument and refraining from issuing written opinions whenever possible).
64. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (relying on the Fifth
Amendment to create a prophylactic rule limiting stationhouse interrogations of suspects without counsel); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (establishing a
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in felony cases).
65. Compare Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (stating that compulsion-filled
interrogation situation at home may be the equivalent of stationhouse interrogation)
with Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (holding that a home interview
of target of investigation is not equivalent to stationhouse interrogation). Compare
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (defining interrogation for Sixth Amendment
purposes) with Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (defining interrogation for
Fifth Amendment purposes). See also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (concluding that a nonresident of searched home had sufficient apparent authority to
consent to the search); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990) (concluding that an
overnight guest has standing to challenge a police entry into the host's home).
66. See, e.g., Norman Darwick, Why Keep Good Evidence Out of Court?, WASH.
POST, Mar. 22, 1983, at A17 ("The [exclusionary] rule punishes society in the long
run, for a criminal, often a dangerous one, is released to continue his unlawful behavior."); Harold Evans, When the Guilty Go Free, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May
22, 1989, at 84 (editorial account of societal anger and frustration at the courts'
frequent release of guilty defendants and calling upon the Supreme Court to "restore
a clear, sensible balance between the rights of the victims and victimizers before
public anger turns to disillusion and panic."); Michael Kinsley, Unleashing the Police:
It's Actually the Fourth Amendment That Critics of the Exclusionary Rule Don't Like,
L.A. DAILY J., June 25, 1991, at 6 (discussing public opinion against the
exclusionary rule and quoting a Wall Street Journal article arguing that the
exclusionary rule "degrades law into a lawyers' game"); On Searches: Trust the Experts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1988 at A34 (describing increasing calls to overturn the
[exclusionary] rule on the basis that "a crime-ridden society can't afford to lose a
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mat for their clients are seen as contributors to the system's
breakdown.
Accompanying the breakdown is the renewed perception that
justice is administered unequally. This perception probably always has existed to some degree.6 7 However, because of the
easy dispositions in the matters of Richard Nixon and Spiro
Agnew" and the defendants in the Watergate break-

case merely because . . . the police officer should have obtained a warrant before he
rummaged in the laundry hamper that held the murder weapon"). Many of the publicized modern decisions involve highly contestable applications of the exclusionary
rule. See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (holding that turning stereo
equipment to view the serial numbers was an unreasonable search not fitting within
the "plain view" exception to the Fourth Amendment); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468
U.S. 1032 (1984) (holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable in deportation hearings);
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (holding that the exclusionary rule did
not bar IRS from pursuing assessment based on unlawfully attained evidence).
67. Perhaps most notably, racial bias in the criminal justice system has long been
noted both in fictional accounts and reports of current cases. See, e.g., HARPER LEE,
To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960) (describing fictional trial of a falsely accused AfricanAmerican in the deep South); CARTER, supra note 51 (an account of racism and the
operation of the southern court system in the case of nine African-American boys
charged with raping two white girls). Moreover, to the extent that wealthy or famous defendants, such as John DeLorean, Claus von Bulow, Michael Jackson, and
Tonya Harding, obtain the highest quality legal assistance and appear to win
unwinnable cases or to buy their way out of criminal liability, the perception of
unequal justice grows. See, e.g., Hugh Dellios, Jackson Civil Suit Settled Out of
Court; Deal, Reportedly in Millions, May Hinder Criminal Inquiry, CHIC. TRIB., Jan.
26, 1994, at 1 (describing outraged reactions to Michael Jackson's settlement of civil
suit which ultimately led to the termination of a grand jury investigation into
Jackson's alleged child molestation); Irving R. Kaufman, The Insanity Plea on Trial,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1982, § 6, at 16, (describing public outrage after "an eight-week
trial replete with conflicting psychiatric testimony and capped by complex legal instructions" resulted in John Hinkley, Jr.'s acquittal by reason of insanity for his
attempted assassination of President Reagan); Tom Maurstad, Jackson Settles Sex
Abuse Suit; Attorney Says Accord is No Admission of Guilt, DALLAS MORN. NEWS,
Jan. 26, 1994, at 1A (discussing reactions to Michael Jackson settlement, including a
criminal law professor's comment that, "[i]f you have a lot of money, you can buy
your way out of trouble.").
68. John M. Crewdson, Jaworski Won't Challenge Pardon, Spokesman Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 1974, at 1 (reporting President Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon and
disapproval by lawmakers and members of the office of Watergate Special Prosecutor
Leon Jaworski); John Herbers, No Conditions Set, Action Taken to Spare Nation and
Ex-Chief, President Asserts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1974, at 1 (stating that President
Ford's decision was based on the "public good"); Michael C. Jensen, Stocks Off on
Agnew News: Move Shocks Businessmen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1973, at 69 (reporting
Agnew resignation and no contest plea to income tax evasion, and the business
community's "shocked" and "dismayed" reaction to the plea).
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ins6 --most of whom were themselves lawyers-the inequalities
became more visible and publicized. As the part of the criminal
justice system that represents clients' interests without regard
to the merits, lawyers increasingly became viewed as amoral. °
Although lawyers in criminal practice led the way in creating
this image, civil litigators were not far behind. With industrial
expansion and corporate liquidity, the use of lawyers increased
dramatically. Corporations, guided by counsel, recognized the
economic benefits that the due process model of lawyering offered well-represented clients.7 1 Lawyers applied Freedman's
client-centered approach beyond the criminal and individual client context.72 Protracted and hardball civil litigation began to
dominate the courts.73 Partly in response to and partly as a

69. See AUERBACH, supra note 44, at 305 ("the Watergate prosecutions revealed a
special standard of justice reserved for those who knew how 'to buy or bargain their
"); Simon, supra note 24, at 31 ("The public disgust at the
way out of trouble . . ....
behavior of the lawyers in the Watergate affair has prompted an elaborate pretense
of soul-searching on the part of the profession . . . ."); cf Wasserstrom, supra note
5, at 3, 11 (discussing significance of the lawyer status of Watergate participants).
70. In tandem, scholarly commentary denouncing lawyer amorality came to be
routine. See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 24, at 429-34 (discussing lawyers' unthinking
acceptance of client positions); William Powers, Jr., Structural Aspects of the Impact
of Law on Moral Duty Within Utilitarianism and Social Contract Theory, 26 UCLA
L. REV. 1263, 1264 (1979) (discussing the "transparency" of law to moral considerations); Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 10 (equating lawyers' perception of professionalism with amorality); cf. Gordon, supra note 12, at 48-51 (questioning the claim
that lawyers' moral independence has decreased over time).
71. To the extent that lawyers are willing to attempt to vindicate all of the rights
clients arguably have, rather than exercising a claim-screening function, clients who
can afford unlimited lawyer effort benefit the most. Under the due process model,
the substitute for lawyer screening is the marketplace; in other words, the amount
of money clients are willing and able to spend on claims that their lawyers identify
as marginal.
72. See Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social
Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503, 50405, 538 (1985) (empirical study arguing that although lawyers in large law firms
"adhere to an ideology of autonomy," in practice they enthusiastically attempt to
maximize client interests without attempting to exert a mediating influence).
73. See, e.g., ABA COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE: A BLUEPRINT FOR REKINDLING PROFESSIONALISM 5 (1986) (discussing increase
in the "'scorched earth' strategy of litigation"); JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS
SOCIETY 3-10 (1981) (discussing the increase in conflict in society and litigation during the 1960s and 1970s); WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 1 (1991)
(detailing why litigation increased during the 1960s and 1970s); Fred C. Zacharias,
Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 374 n.103 (1989) (citing authori-
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result of the due process model, a plaintiffs bar grew and adopted the client-centered approach. Civil litigation proliferated.74
The increase in civil and criminal litigation is not itself evil. 5
However, when combined with a model of lawyering that emphasizes zealous advocacy over most other values, it results in a
congested justice system and a general societal perception that
the process only tangentially focuses on achieving accurate results.7 6 The recent advent of legal advertising, through which
lawyers prompt litigation, increases our sense that lawyers not
only are partly responsible, but also that they like the pro77
cess.

ties); cf Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3
(1986) (suggesting that litigation has not increased, but rather has been redistributed). The term "hardball" tactics first surfaced in the case law in the mid-1960s.
Enoch, supra note 34, at 209 n.72.
74. As the due process model developed, courts and legislatures joined in developing rules and practices that made it easier for plaintiffs to file and maintain lawsuits. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (facilitating the commencement of class actions in
matters involving limited individual damages).
75. Indeed, the increase may signify that justice is being dispensed more widely.
See, e.g., BARLOW F. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 13738 (1970) (arguing that increased utilization of lawyers is the most important value
that may be served by allowing lawyers the freedom to advertise and solicit business); BARBARA A. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC 228 (1977) (discussing
the importance of publicizing lawyers as "reasonable, appropriate or readily identifiable problem-solving resources"); Comment, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against
Solicitation by Lawyers, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 674, 676-77 (1958) (arguing that attorney
solicitation is beneficial because it enables clients to enforce valid claims that would
otherwise be neglected); Whitney Thier, Comment, In a Dignified Manner: The Bar,
the Court, and Lawyer Advertising, 66 TUL. L. REV. 527, 542 (1991) (canvassing
arguments that legal advertising is a "good" because it enables people to better
understand and pursue their legal rights) and authorities cited therein; cf Bates v.
State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 376-77 (1977) (suggesting that increasing the use of advertising is beneficial in helping people of moderate means vindicate their rights in
court).
76. See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice:
Can Prosecutors Do Justice, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 55-56 (1991) (noting defects in the
adversary system as a truth-determining mechanism and suggesting alternative justifications for the system); see also authorities cited in id. at 55 nn.43-50.
77. Legal advertising, of course, may prompt worthy litigation. However, advertising by lawyers who suggest contacting a lawyer for every misfortune (e.g., "have
you ever had a bicycle accident?") encourages the public to use litigation to resolve
problems that might better be forgotten or addressed through other means. Cf
Thier, supra note 75, at 543 (discussing arguments that lawyers misuse advertising
to "encourage nonmeritorious litigation").

1326

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1303

There probably is some truth to that perception. In practice,
lawyers gravitate to the notion that they should act in purely
partisan fashion. The professional codes do not require this
approach; most afford lawyers significant discretion in accepting
clients, giving advice, and selecting litigation tactics.7" Yet lawyers often do not even consider exercising their discretion, because they choose to filter the codes through the lens of the due
process model. Although their interpretation of the rules may
derive from the attitude developed in the history of the 1960s
and early 1970s, at least equally relevant is the fact that unthinking client orientation fills lawyers' pocketbooks. 79 Blind
adherence to a due process model allows lawyers to accept and
prosecute most cases without qualm, resulting in increased legal
work and higher fees. A strict policy of client orientation enables
lawyers to satisfy their employers. It avoids the need to confront
what might be difficult moral choices for lawyers and their clients.
The upshot is that by the 1980s, a backlash against lawyers'
attitudes developed. Commentators have reacted to Freedman's
philosophy, many charging that his view of appropriate partisanship goes too far."0 A relatively new branch of philosophical

78. The discretionary aspects of the codes are discussed at length at infra Part
III. Geoffrey Hazard suggests that, even in the attorney-client confidentiality area, in
which codes seek to control lawyer discretion, the code drafters have recognized and
preserved important sanctuaries of lawyer autonomy. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyers and Client Fraud: They Still Don't Get It, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 701 (1993)
(arguing the need for a zone of discretion in confidentiality rules).
79. See Langevoort, supra note 4, at 94 (arguing that economic incentives predispose lawyers to accept that principles of client loyalty make "continued involvement
with a wrongdoing client . . . ethically acceptable, perhaps even laudable").
80. See Warren E. Burger, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and Defense Personnel: A Judge's Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 11, 12 (1966) (rejecting Freedman's
response to difficult questions faced by defense attorneys); Noonan, supra note 55, at
1492 (arguing that a lawyer must balance the requirements of the adversary system,
his own "standards as a human person," and the "requirements of the society which
the system serves"); Kenneth Pye, The Role of Counsel in the Suppression of Truth,
1978 DUKE L.J. 921, 922-25 (arguing that a lawyer should balance client interests
against the degree to which tactics impede the purposes of the criminal process);
Simon, supra note 24, at 114-15 (arguing that conflict between lawyer and client
should be possible within and outside the lawyer-client relationship and that lawyers
should treat problems inherent in advocacy as a matter of personal ethics); Harry I.
Subin, The Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission". Reflections on the "Right" to Pres-
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scholarship concentrates so heavily on the perceived client orientation of lawyers that it suggests that objectivity in legal practice is virtually non-existent."' Although this school of thought
may overstate the case, 82 it has focused renewed attention on
the subject of professionalism, just as Freedman did in the
1970s. In 1983, the ABA adopted the Model Rules which, even
in their diluted final form, diminish the Code3 of Professional
Responsibility's emphasis on zealous advocacy.
Yet, insofar as modern professional regulation recognizes the
importance of lawyers' exercising objectivity, it grants lawyers
leeway. Lawyers who continue to interpret their role as that of a
pure advocate-for historical or personal and financial reasons-will decline to incorporate other values. Society's perception of professionalism was enhanced in the civil rights period
with Freedman's call for lawyers to role-differentiate more-to
consider their obligations to individual clients and the legal
system over personal moral instincts. The swinging of the pendulum to the other extreme, in which members of the bar often
rely on client-oriented rules to decline exercising moral judgment, has contributed to society's perception that professionalism has declined once again.
III. OBJECTIVITY UNDER THE PROFESSIONAL CODES
All legal ethics codes expect lawyers to role-differentiate. In
principle, role-differentiation is consistent with objective moral
decisionmatdng. It simply requires lawyers to order their con-

ent a False Case, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125 (1987) (attempting to define limits
"on the methods a lawyer should be willing to use when his or her client's goals are
inconsistent with the truth").
81. See authorities cited supra notes 9-11.
82. See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 7, at 1542-43 (challenging five empirical claims
of the "philosophers' school" and arguing that the school overstates its case).
83. For example, MOtDEL RULES Rule 1.3 cmt. states:
A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of
the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf. However, a
client is not bound to press for every advantage that might be realized
for a client. A lawyer has professional discretion in determining the
means by which a matter should be pursued.
See also Zacharias, supra note 6, at 224 nn.3-4 (discussing the development of the
professional codes).
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duct with a view to the effects of the conduct on the legal system. At times, lawyers must forgo action that seems morally
appropriate because the action or similar actions by all lawyers
cumulatively might have a negative effect on the system's ability
to achieve justice. 4 However, in pursuing the "higher values"
that zealous advocacy furthers, lawyers retain their discretion."5
Lawyer objectivity often loses out when role-differentiation
theory is committed to ethics rules. The theory only calls upon
lawyers to consider their systemic role in making moral judg-

84. See, e.g., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: REPORT OF THE JOINT CONFERENCE,
reprinted in 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1159-62 (1958) (discussing the importance of adversarial advocacy in obtaining the system's intended results); Luban, supra note 1,
at 111-13 (discussing argument that the adversary system as a whole produces a
good body of results); Wasserstrom, supra note 1, at 30 (discussing the argument
that "the legal system will end up doing more justice to more persons than would
focused mode of moral deliberation."). Thus, for
be the case under any less ...
example, a lawyer must represent even guilty or blameworthy clients zealously so
that potential clients will use lawyers and the adversary system can operate efficiently. John Kaplan, Defending Guilty People, 7 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 223 (1986)
(offering systemic justification); John B. Mitchell, The Ethics of the Criminal Defense
Attorney-New Answers to Old Questions, 32 STAN. L. REV. 293, 297-98 (1980) (asserting the need for lawyers to represent guilty clients so the system's "screening"
function will work). Similarly, lawyers must refrain from disclosing confidences to
help third parties, because disclosure would undermine the trust all clients are expected to place in the profession. See Zacharias, supra note 73, at 358 (discussing
systemic justifications for confidentiality rules) and authorities cited id. at 358 nn.
28-29.
85. See MONROE FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 3-6 (1976)
(discussing the lawyer's "obligation" to impose barriers to the discovery of truth); cf
Morgan, supra note 11, at 451-52 (arguing that the larger societal goals of the legal
profession have become increasingly lost in the contemporary emphasis on short-term
client goals); Stier, supra note 7, at 555 (characterizing role-differentiation theory as
positing "a total separation between personal morality and the law of lawyering").
My analysis of the interrelationship between role-differentiation, objectivity, and
the professional codes describes the manner in which most ethicists and commentators view the codes. It might be possible to adopt a highly specific code of professional conduct, which all lawyers must obey, that reflects the shared wisdom of the
bar. In other words, professional regulation might instruct lawyers in how to balance
competing interests in all situations. Virtually all existing codes, however, avoid that
approach, probably for good reason. See Zacharias, supra note 6, at 249-85 (discussing the problems inherent in drafting overly specific codes); cf Bruce A. Green, Zealous Representation Bound: The Intersection of the Ethical Codes and the Criminal
Law, 69 N.C. L. REV. 687 (1991) (advocating more specificity in particular aspects of
the codes). That approach also is inconsistent with most lawyers' image of themselves as "professionals" empowered to exercise independent judgment.
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ments; in other words, to consider the -needs of the legal system
in balancing moral values. Professional rules, either in their
terms or application, may encourage lawyers to overemphasize
role.86 When lawyers rely on inflexible rules instead of making
judgments concerning the appropriateness of different courses of
conduct in light of all the relevant interests, 7 they risk losing

86. Consider, for example, a case featured in a recent California ethics opinion.
San Diego County Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics and Unlawful Practices Comm., Op. 19901. At the time the opinion was issued, California law seemed to mandate absolute
attorney-client confidentiality. CAL. Bus. & PRO. CODE § 6068(e) (West 1994) ("It is
the duty of an attorney to . . . maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril
to himself or herself fo preserve the secrets, of his or her client."). A client told his
lawyer that he intended to kill his co-defendant. Believing the client, the lawyer
sought advice from the local bar and was informed that the California rules did
require him to maintain his silence. Cf Fred C. Zacharias, Privilege and Confidentiality in California, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 365 (1995) (describing December, 1993
amendment to California's attorney-client privilege and the arguments that this
amendment implicitly amended California's confidentiality statute or codified existing
public policy exceptions to confidentiality).
Role-differentiation theory does not mandate this result. It only suggests that,
in deciding whether to disclose, a lawyer should consider the implications of disclosure on the legal system. In other words, the lawyer should consider whether her
role and the importance of having professionals serve that role morally justify silence
in the face of the negative effects on the third-party. The California rule (as interpreted by the bar committee) changes the approach by depriving lawyers of the right
or obligation to weigh values. It establishes an absolute principle that a lawyer's
role in the system includes a duty not to weigh considerations militating against
confidentiality.
87. Few rules are as rigid as the California confidentiality rule discussed in supra
note 86. Lawyers, however, have interpreted many ethics provisions as foreclosing
consideration of third-party and societal values. Some lawyers interpret the duty of
zealous advocacy as requiring them to take all steps on behalf of clients that are
not expressly forbidden. See MODEL CODE Canon 7 ("A Lawyer Should Represent a
Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law.") and accompanying disciplinary
rules; MODEL RULES Rule 1.3 cmt. ("A lawyer should act . . . with zeal in advocacy."); Freedman, Ethical Ends, supra note 54, at 55-57 (1991) ("[Mly central concern
is . . . how far I can ethically go . .. to" achieve for my client full and equal rights
under law. . . . I expressly reject moral neutrality and nonaccountability."); Stephanie B. Goldberg, Playing Hardball, A.B.A. J., July 1, 1987, at 48, 50 (quoting attorney Gerry Spence as stating that the lawyer's role is to go "right up to the line").
Other lawyers interpret provisions that permit them to make nonfrivolous claims as
requiring the lawyers to engage in hardball or dilatory tactics without concern for
third-party interests or the effect of those tactics on results. See MODEL RULES Rule
3.1 (permitting a lawyer to assert all nonfrivolous arguments and claims); MODEL
CODE DR 7-102(A)(1)-(2) (stating that a lawyer shall not take action "merely to harass . . . another", but may advance any claim "if it can be supported by good faith
argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law") (emphasis add-
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the very independence that role-differentiation theory seeks to
maximize."
The following pages evaluate several categories of hypothetical situations in which a significant segment of society, as well
as commentators, would question the appropriateness of the
hypothetical lawyer's conduct. 9 I analyze how a lawyer who
maintains a sense of objectivity would approach each problem; I
try to identify what society might expect an honest, "professional" lawyer to do. Next, I consider whether the codes resolve the
issues and, if not, where the hypothetical lawyer's personal or
economic incentives lead. Finally, I consider how the lawyer who
acts upon those incentives would justify her conduct.
I make several assumptions. Perhaps most significant, I assume that society has simultaneous interests in maintaining a
bar that will do its best for clients and in achieving fair and

ed); Mark A. Dombroff, Winning is Everything, 12 NAT'L L.J., Sept. 25, 1989, at 13
("[T]o a litigator winning is everything.").
The above rules all are written in permissive terms. The codes also include
separate indications that lawyers should not always exercise their prerogative to act
aggressively. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 1.3 cmt. ("[A] lawyer is not bound to
press for every advantage."); MODEL CODE EC 7-10 ("The duty of a lawyer to represent his client with zeal does not militate against his concurrent obligation to treat
with consideration all persons involved in the legal process and to avoid the infliction of needless harm."). Modern lawyers, however, routinely interpret the rules so
as to avoid introspection.
88. Lawyers often are subject to extra-code sanctions for their actions. One might
expect these sanctions to create an incentive for lawyers to exercise their discretion
under the codes. However, courts applying extra-code sanctions typically have accepted as a defense to sanctions that the ethics codes permitted a lawyer's conduct.
The most recent draft of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers proposes
that lawyers should be deemed immune from malpractice liability "for any action or
inaction the lawyer reasonably believed to be required by . . . a professional rule."
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76(4) (Tentative Draft
No. 7, April 7, 1994). The ALI is considering an amendment that would extend the
immunity, to "any action or inaction the lawyer reasonably believed to be required,
or reasonably believed to be discretionary in the judgment of the lawyer, under . . .
a professional rule." Motion submitted to the ALI (May 1994) (taken under advisement). This approach would enable lawyers to assert virtually any exercise of discretion under the codes as a defense to civil liability.
89. Of course, the term "society" encompasses a variety of views. Moreover, clients
may have different, subjective, views than they would hold if they were observing
the system at arm's length. In this Article, I refer primarily to the mainstream
views that most reasonable laypersons would hold in considering the legal system on
an objective basis.
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accurate resolutions of disputes. The analysis also assumes that
both interests are not absolute. In other words, the notion of
legal partisanship does not mean that lawyers should operate
without rules or limits on their behavior. Nor should society's
interest in ascertaining truth in any given case be allowed to
undermine client "rights" or the long-term adversarial system to
which we are currently committed.
Exploring the hypotheticals should provide several insights.
First, it will illustrate the extent to which the codes themselves
are likely to produce "professional" behavior and the manner in
which lawyers will respond to ambiguities in the code. Second,
the focus on lawyers' explanations for their conduct will demonstrate how the codes, as they have developed, can be misused to
defeat the codes' very purpose of fostering lawyer introspection
and objectivity. Third, by highlighting this process, the analysis
may help identify mechanisms for restoring a better balance
between partisanship and objectivity in the modern lawyer's
everyday role.
A. Lawyer Misrepresentations
There are many settings in which clients want lawyers to
misrepresent what the lawyers actually believe or know to be
the truth. In negotiations, for example, clients do not expect
lawyers to volunteer the clients' bottom-line positions. Puffing is
routine (e.g., "we won't settle for a penny less than $1,000,000").
In situations in which delay benefits the client, lawyers often
will promise to move matters along even when they have no
intention of doing so (e.g., "I'll discuss it with my client and get
back to you").
When lawyers speak with the press about publicized cases,
they also frequently overstate or misstate their own opinions."
No lawyer would ever tell the press of her reservations about
the client's innocence or the justness of the client's cause.
Once in court, lawyers routinely dissemble. By arguing marginal positions as if they are meritorious, lawyers at a minimum
90. Cf. Paul T. Hayden, Reconsidering the Litigator'sAbsolute Privilege to Defame,
54 OHIO ST. L.J. 985, 988 (1993) (citing data that suggests lawyers increasingly are
being sued for defamation arising from public statements in litigation).
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give a false impression regarding their own evaluation of the
issues. Pleadings, and motions may present a range of incomplete, misleading, or downwright deceitful information." Although some, perhaps even most, lawyers never lie outright,
virtually all lawyers stretch points, take positions that they
would reject as a decisionmaker, and argue perverse interpretations of the facts. 9
Society takes a dim view of laypersons who lie or
mischaracterize facts, be they negotiators in consumer sales,9 3
public figures speaking to the press,9 4 or parties to lawsuits

91. See Philip Shuchman, The Question of Lawyers' Deceit, 53 CONN. B.J. 101,
115-18 (1979) (describing deceitful pleadings and tactics by lawyers).
92. These practices are not confined to pure litigation. Lawyers practicing before
administrative bodies also tend to act like advocates. See Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335, 368-69 (1994) (discussing controversial position of the Office of Thrift Supervision and other government agencies that lawyers
representing regulated industries before administrative agencies act as agents rather
than advocates) and authorities cited at id. at nn.152-56. Similarly, lawyers who
advise clients with respect to regulations often are willing to assert outlandish positions, so long as they are "arguable." Tax lawyers, for example, typically will claim
any exemption that cannot be shown to be in "bad faith" (e.g., because it has been
rejected previously). Cf Gordon, supra note 12, at 27-29 (discussing possible approaches of lawyers in the context of providing advice).
93. Even in a period of government deregulation, the United States has seen a
dramatic expansion in consumer protection, including new and better statutes which
forbid consumer fraud and assure consumers "cooling off' periods during which consumers can avoid the consequences of seller misrepresentations. ALI-ABA, A
TRUNCATED OVERVIEW OF STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS 375 (Publ. C888 1994)
(cataloguing a variety of consumer protection statutes); ALI-ABA, SEE DICK AND
JANE SUE: A PRIMER ON STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS 321 (Publ. C801 1993);
cf Richard K. Burke, "Truth in Lawyering": An Essay on Lying and Deceit in the
Practice of Law, 38 ARK. L. REV. 1, 23 n.77 (1984) (comparing lawyer deception to
deceptions prohibited by various consumer protection statutes).
94. See Doyle McManus, The Big Lie: New Politics of Mendacity, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
18, 1992, at Al, A5 (identifying the candidates' personal character and honesty, or
lack thereof, as one of the critical issues in the 1992 presidential campaign); Thomas
B. Rosenstiel, Press Scrutiny Becomes Added Obstacle for Clinton, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
1, 1992, at Al, A9 (noting the public's doubts about the character for truthfulness of
both parties' 1992 presidential candidates); Jeffrey Schmalz, Despite Denials, Many
Hesitate About Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1992, at A19 (noting the public's doubt
about the character of then 1992 presidential candidate Bill Clinton); Martin
Schram, A Loose Fit: Truth and the Candidates, NEWSDAY, Sept. 29, 1992, at 83 (reporting that presidential candidates too often opt for telling distorted stories rather
than the politically unpopular truth); cf Agnew v. Maryland, 446 A.2d 425, 444-45
(Md. App. 1982) (abrogating politician's attorney-client privilege because politician
published book untruthfully reporting his conversations with his attorney).
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who exaggerate their cause. America's adversarial legal tradition, however, is sufficiently ingrained that observers of the legal system do not expect total candor from lawyers. Most lay
observers would be horrified were a defense lawyer to announce
a client's guilt. In most of the potential misrepresentation situations described above, society's perception of professionalism
would not require lawyers to volunteer objective truth.95 It
therefore may be useful to consider the scenarios, to try to identify what neutral lay observers would expect of the professional,9 6 and to look at how the codes currently require lawyers to
act.
As a general matter, most laypersons probably believe that
advocacy or client-orientation does not justify direct lying. In
other words, lawyers should not assert facts that they know to
be false for the purpose of inducing others to rely on those assertions. 7 At the opposite extreme, most observers of the legal

95. Sissela Bok has noted that "[tihe whole truth is out of reach. But that has
very little to do with our choices about whether to lie or speak honestly." SISSELA
BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 4 (1978). Like Bok, I focus
on those core misrepresentations that, when viewed honestly, everyone would agree
are intentional misstatements designed to mislead other persons into acting differently than they might otherwise act. See id. at 6, 8, 13.
96. In evaluating lay perceptions of what is appropriate behavior, it is important
to distinguish laypersons as a whole from laypersons involved in the particular legal
matter. Clients may want or expect their lawyers to act in an aggressive manner to
maximize the clients' interests even though neutral observers--or the clients themselves were they uninvolved-would disapprove of the conduct. In determining what
behavior is appropriate, the clients' personal viewpoints may sometimes be significant; for example, in evaluating the effect of confidentiality on the legal system. See
Zacharias, supra note 73, at 395 n.227 (discussing the tension between attitudes of
observers and clients). For other purposes-including determining how society as a
whole would prefer lawyers to approach practice-it makes more sense to emphasize
laypersons' objective normative assessments. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of
the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 875-76 (1990)
(demonstrating the importance of evaluating lawyer tactics from the perspective of
clients who do not know whether they will be targets or beneficiaries of the tactics).
97. See BOK, supra note 95, at 6 (defining lying as intentional misstatements).
Bok notes that "the casual approach of professionals [to lying] is wholly out of joint
with the [public's] view." Id. at xvii; see also Stanley, supra note 16, at 3 (being an
officer of the court "means that lawyers will be totally honest with the courts and
with each other").
To consider the issues raised in this Article, one need not delve into the problem of when lawyers "know" a statement is false and what level of knowledge
should be required before a lawyer may reject as false information provided by cli-
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system would expect lawyers to try to achieve a.good result for
even guilty or liable clients.9"
In the negotiation context, one can imagine that a society
interested in just results would expect lawyers to seek not the
best deal for their clients, but rather a result that, viewed objectively, is both good for the clients and fair.99 That would entail
(1) avoiding assertions designed to confuse or mislead adversaries, (2) attempting to persuade clients to agree to settlements
that are reasonable in light of the clients' obligations, and (3)
avoiding lawyering tactics that artificially prevent reasonable

ents. See H. Richard Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth, and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1076-80 (1975) (noting the
difficulty in determining how a lawyer should "know or recognize the truth," but accepting the postulate that there is a core of "known or knowable truth"). Lawyers
clearly make some statements that, viewed fairly, can only be considered truthful
through rationalization; for example, in situations in which the client informs the
lawyer of contrary facts. See, e.g., Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer's "Different
Mission". Reflections on the "Right" to Present a False Case, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
125, 126-28 (1987) (defining when a lawyer can reasonably be presumed to know a
defense is "false"). Even where there is a serious possibility that the client is being
truthful, this Article's observations remain pertinent, for they address how lawyers
should respond to statements of questionable veracity without rationalization. Cf.
BOK, supra note 95, at 4 (focusing on core statements that reasonably can be
deemed lies).
98. See James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in
Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 926, 927 (noting a lawyer's paradoxical role
in settlements: conducting fair and truthful negotiation while attempting to lead the
other side into underestimating the value of his case).

99. One reason for this orientation is that negotiated settlements do not result
from an objective determination of "rights" and "obligations," because a judge is not
involved. Thus, almost by definition, the goal of negotiations should be a "fair" result
or compromise that both parties can live with given the realities of the litigation.
See PHILIP SPERBER, ATTORNEY'S PRACTICE GUIDE TO NEGOTIATIONS 10-11 (1985)

(arguing that the key to a successful negotiation is to put the other party "in the
proper state of mind to permit the changing of the status quo" and to convince the
other party that "you made all possible concessions"). In practice, however, the absence of a neutral arbitrator may lead to more lying by lawyers because the lawyers

do not fear judicial oversight. See Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 659, 664 (1990) (noting that deception of clients usually happens in private,
and therefore receives "less scrutiny than when the lawyer appears before a tribunal"); cf CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT xvi-

xvii (2d ed. 1993) (positing that, while observers may believe negotiations should be
conducted on a "win-win" basis, advocates have a duty to maximize the result for
their clients); GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 8 (1983)

(citing authorities which urge lawyers to maximize results of negotiations at virtually
all cost).
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settlements, including threats to use the lawyer's skill to delay,
injure, or prevent future recovery if the opposing party does not
agree to accept a low offer.100
The codes allow lawyers to satisfy these expectations, but the
codes are ambiguous. The Model Rules for example, forbid making false statements in negotiations, 1 ' while condoning "puffing" and adherence to negotiation "conventions."'0 2 The Rules
encourage lawyers to communicate with clients regarding appropriate means and objectives,' 3 while emphasizing the lawyer's
duty to maximize client interests' 4 and the client's right to
100. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1283
(1973) (holding that a lawyer may threaten a class action upon the adversary's failure to settle even though her client cannot bear the cost, provided that the lawyer
truly intends to bring the class action). The principles noted in the text are malleable and would require better definition if this Article's proposals were adopted. See
generally Reed E. Loder, Moral Truth Seeking and the Virtuous Negotiator, 8 GEO. J.
LEG. ETHICS 45, 50-57, 93-101 (1994) (cataloguing different kinds of deception in
negotiations and offering a "moral theory" for identifying appropriate conduct.). The
goal here simply is to identify the contours of what society might expect professional
behavior to include.
101. MODEL RULES Rule 4.1 ("[A] lawyer shall not knowingly . .. make a false
statement of material fact or law to a third person."); accord MODEL CODE DR 7102(A)(5).
102. MODEL RULES Rule 4.1 cmt. ("Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material
fact.").
Geoffrey Hazard, the Reporter for the Model Rules, emphasizes the importance
of prevailing "conventions" in establishing what "truth" lawyers should tell. In
Hazard's view, conventions define trustworthiness throughout society and mitigate
the difficulties of defining principles of honesty that cut across geographical and
class lines. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Lawyer's Obligation to Be Trustworthy
When Dealing with Opposing Parties, 33 S.C. L. REV. 181, 182-83 (1981). Hazard
contends that conventional "trustworthiness is not simply the moral virtue of veracity but is an amalgam of moral virtue, market sense, and physiological and political
discernment." Id. at 183; cf Thomas F. Guernsey, Truthfulness in Negotiation, 17 U.
RICH. L. REV. 99, 100 (1982) (noting problems of relying on conventions resulting
from the difficulty in determining which communities' conventions to adopt).
Hazard's practical point is easy to understand, if not to accept. Using conventions as a surrogate for rulemaking eases the task of code drafters in making fine
distinctions. See White, supra note 98, at 931 ("despair[ing]" of regulating honesty in
negotiations through rules). Hazard's normative view, however, is more troublesome.
The existence of conventions does not, in and of itself, make conformance to those
conventions appropriate. Simply because a set of lawyers lie, and always have lied,
does not justify that practice. Cf. BOK, supra note 95, at xvii (criticizing "the casual
approach" of lawyers and other professionals toward lying).
103. MODEL RULES Rule 1.4(g) (requiring a lawyer to keep clients informed).
104. MODEL RULES Rule 1.4 cmt. ("The guiding principle is that the lawyer should
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control settlements and pleas.' The codes express disapproval
of delay..6 and state that lawyers need not employ all possible
tactics,0 7 but also appear to subordinate these preferences to
client interests.'
In practice, therefore, the codes provide authority for virtually any approach the negotiating lawyer chooses
to take.'0 9
How are lawyers likely to react? Only the most outrageous
lies in negotiations are likely to affect a lawyer's reputation
enough to harm her practice. Negotiations tend to be private, so
that in any given case only opposing counsel and the opposing
party will know what the lawyer has said."0 Once the matter
is settled, they are unlikely to develop the facts further to uncover the mistruths."'

fulfill reasonable client expectations for information consistent with the duty to act
in the client's best interests .

. . .");

see also id. Rule 1.2 cmt. ("[A] lawyer is not

required to pursue objectives or employ means simply because a client may wish
that the lawyer do so."); id. Rule 1.3 cmt. ("A lawyer should act with commitment
and dedication to the interests of the client . .

").

i05. MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(a) (providing for a client's right to control the objectives of litigation).
106. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 3.2 (requiring lawyers to expedite litigation);
MODEL CODE DR 7-102(A)(1) (forbidding delay to injure or harass another).
107. MODEL RULES Rule 1.3 cmt. ([A] lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client."); MODEL CODE EC 7-10 (noting limits to
duty of zeal).
108. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 1.2 cmt. (requiring a lawyer to defer to the client
regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely affected); id. Rule 3.2 (subordinating the lawyer's duty
to expedite litigation to "the interests of the client ....");MODEL CODE EC 7-8 ("In
the final analysis . . .the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or
methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client"); id. DR 7-102(A)(1)
(forbidding dilatory tactics when harassment is their sole purpose).
109. See Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L.
REV. 577, 580, 589 (1975) (noting that "nowhere is it ordained that the lawyer owes
any general duty of candor or fairness to [those] with whom he may deal as a negotiator" and arguing for adoption of a standard requiring lawyers to "act honestly and
in good faith") (emphasis omitted).
110. See White, supra note 98, at 926-27 (discussing consequences of the private
nature of negotiations).
111. Outrageous lies in negotiations may be obvious to the adversary, with the
possible result that the adversary will spread word of the speaker's lack of trustworthiness. For the most part, however, lawyers have little incentive to denigrate other
lawyers with whom they may have to deal in the future.
The calculus may shift in smaller jurisdictions or in types of practice dominated
by a limited number of lawyers. See Hazard, supra note 102, at 194-95 (noting that
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Lawyers' economic incentives should cause them to act in a
partisan fashion even without the encouragement of professional
regulation. A lawyer's willingness to misrepresent enhances her
standing with the client."' If the misrepresentation is successful, the recovery and the concomitant fees will increase. Indeed,
the bar as a whole has reason to countenance misrepresentations. A general practice of puffing in the bar allows all lawyers
to demonstrate their client orientation to clients. To the extent
that clients themselves or other negotiators would hesitate to
overstate facts, lawyers become more indispensable."' Admittedly, the bar has an interest in establishing some conventions
regarding lying, because the ability to predict the quality of
lawyers' representations reduces transaction costs among lawyers."' However, the standards set in those conventions will
be low. The long-term effect deceptive practices have in undermining society's confidence in lawyer professionalism is relatively abstract and is unlikely to seem economically significant
to lawyers currently engaged in the practices." 5

lawyers adjust their truthfulness depending upon whom they are dealing with). A
lawyer's habit of lying may become obvious more easily to other members of the bar.
In the future, they will not accept the lawyer's word. See Guernsey, supra note 102,
at 100-01 (noting that lawyers as a whole may not share a common conception of
fairness in negotiations and that perceptions may differ among different communities); White, supra note 98, at 930 (discussing differences in expectations among
small-town and big-city lawyers). Because this phenomenon increases transaction
costs in dealings involving this lawyer, clients may learn to avoid her. Arguably, the
other lawyers have an economic incentive not to refuse to deal, but rather to deal in
kind. Although transaction costs may increase to the clients' detriment, so will the
lawyers' opportunity to continue the litigation. Accordingly, all the lawyers involved
can justify charging additional fees.
112. Even clients who value their own integrity may appreciate a lawyer's willingness to "do the dirty work" for them in a system that appears to depend upon aggressiveness to achieve fair results.
113. For example, accountants accustomed to disclosure requirements under securities laws might not consider absolute client orientation as part of their role. Clients
themselves might hesitate to misrepresent because they do not feel right doing so.
In other words, clients' roles as moral individuals may lead them to impose selfrestraints on their conduct.
114. See generally Hazard, supra note 102, at 183-84. In contrast, the absence of
conventions deprives lawyers of "norms of fairness in negotiation and the institutional means to give effect to [those] norms." Id. at 193.
115. In assessing lawyers' personal and economic incentives, it is important to
recognize that people tend to evaluate the consequences of their acts on a short-term
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A similar phenomenon exists with respect to the courtroom
context. Society's increasingly dim view of lawyer professionalism stems, in part, from the perceived contribution of lawyers to
several flaws in the legal system: court congestion that delays
justice, the expense of pursuing one's day in court, and the
system's failure to achieve correct results. Yet society still expects lawyers to advocate for clients. 116 Presumably, where
lawyers fall short is in failing to screen their activities to avoid
arguments and filings that are made for the wrong reasons" 7
or that have little realistic chance of success." 8
Again, ambiguity pervades the codes, this time perhaps tipping the balance more clearly in favor of lawyers making all
possible arguments. The codes start with a premise of zeal." 9
Although stating that lawyers need not "press for every advantage,"12 ° the clear implication of the codes is that lawyers
should maximize client interests. 2 ' The codes disapprove of
frivolous arguments and those made solely for reasons of delay
or harassment, but by their terms seem to approve of marginal

basis. Liars, in particular, are likely to "weigh only the immediate harm to others
from the lie against the benefits they want to achieve." BOK, supra note 95, at 24.
This approach overlooks both the long-term harm that lying does to the liar herself
and the "harm done to the general level of trust and social cooperation." Id.
116. See Robert C. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a
Dark Glass, 75 CAL. L. REV. 379 (1987) (discussing society's ambivalent attitude
toward lawyer conduct); Zacharias, supra note 73, at 375 (discussing society's attitudes towards attorneys as a result of attorney-client confidentiality).
117. These reasons may include delay, overwhelming the opponent financially, or
taking advantage of favorable prejudgment interest rates.
118. A lawyer might file such claims when a client is wealthy and agrees to file
because he has nothing to lose, or when the client has appointed or legal aid counsel and therefore does not need to pay the cost of wasteful litigation.
119. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.3 cmt.; MODEL CODE Canon 7.
120. MODEL RULES Rule 1.3 cmt. The comments to the Model Rules express this
warning explicitly, but the Model Code only suggests it. See MODEL CODE EC 7-10
(noting other obligations that are concurrent with the duty of zeal).
121. The Model Code for example, devotes an entire "Canon" to the principle of
zealousness. See MODEL CODE Canon 7. Throughout the Model Rules one finds references to the dominance of client wishes. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(a) ("A
lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . . ."); id. Rule 1.2 cmt. (requiring lawyers to defer to clients on questions of
potential harm to third parties); id. Rule 1.7 cmt. ("Loyalty is an essential element
in the lawyer's relationship to a client.").
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arguments that have some, albeit slight, chance of success.122
Both personal and economic incentives encourage the lawyer
not to screen arguments. The more arguments she makes, the
more zealous she appears to the client. It also builds her workload and the accompanying billing opportunities. Moreover,
presenting all plausible arguments is the economically safest
course. Accidental overscreening of a good argument can subject
the lawyer to malpractice liability or discipline for "lack of diligence," as well as to criticism from other lawyers attempting to
steal the client.
The media context presents a different set of issues. In negotiations, society may want a lawyer to temper her assertions in
recognition of the fact that some results are fairer than others;
in other words, to acknowledge the other party's rights. In the
courtroom, society may want the lawyer to take into account the
societal interest in an efficient judicial system. Where publicity
is involved, the lawyer's own integrity is at stake, because the
lawyer voluntarily exposes herself to public view; she could carry
out her mission without addressing the media. Recognizing this
fact, the public probably would expect the lawyer to be zealous
but, as a moral person, not to lie."m Acceptable public comment
might include only (1) honest statements, (2) "no-comments," or
(3) responses to statements others (including the press) have
made that prejudice the client.
Here the codes are slightly more explicit. They limit trial
24
publicity, enumerating specific types of acceptable speech.
The regulations, however, do not refer to the lawyer's own belief
in her statements or to the publicity to which the lawyer may be
responding. Perhaps more significantly, the trial publicity rules
tend not to be enforced, even in the face of clear violations.'25
122. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.1; MODEL CODE DR 7-102(A)(2).
123. Carrie Menkel-Meadow has noted academia's failure to consider lawyers' "public" deceptions in the media. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lying to Clients for Economic
Gain or Paternalistic Judgment: A Proposalfor a Golden Rule of Candor, 138 U. PA.
L. REV. 761, 777-80 (1990). Menkel-Meadow suggests that, by exploring this form of
deception, one can better examine -the real concerns about lawyer deception; namely,
the public's sense that it cannot trust lawyers as a whole. Id.
124. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.6(b) (listing topics likely to violate the rules); id.
Rule 3.6(c) (describing acceptable topics); MODEL CODE DR 7-107(A) (describing acceptable topics).
125. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors,53 U. PITr. L. REV. 393,
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As a consequence, the rules in practice provide less guidance to
lawyers, and are more ambiguous, than appears on the surface.
It is more difficult to identify lawyers' natural incentives in
this context than in the others previously discussed. Because
lawyers are themselves on the line and visible, their personal
sense of integrity may assume more importance. On the other
hand, their time in the spotlight is limited. By using the press to
appear partisan and aggressive, they may garner respect and
new clients. A lawyer's false assertion of strength, later disproved by the facts at trial, ordinarily will never become the
focus of negative publicity because post-trial media attention is
likely to address the verdict and jurors rather than the advocates at the earlier trial. At a minimum, the lawyer reasonably
may conclude that the bird-in-the-hand of positive pretrial publicity is more valuable than the risk of negative publicity later
on.
The above scenarios in which lawyers might engage in misrepresentation demonstrate that the current regulatory scheme
offers lawyers the option of acting objectively-of remaining true
to generally-accepted values in a way that most observers would
consider "professional." The codes, however, do not require such
conduct. When the codes authorize lawyers to choose between
emphasizing partisanship and important third party or societal
interests, lawyers' natural incentives encourage them to select
partisanship. Lawyers who make that choice can readily justify
their conduct as mandated by the code by claiming adherence to
the code provisions that call for zeal.126
B. Employing ProperTactics To Help Wrongful Clients Win
Every lawyer at some point must answer the question "how
can you represent a guilty (or liable) person?"12 7 The typical

443-45 (1992) (arguing that bar associations rarely discipline prosecutors for violations of gag orders or trial publicity rules); cf Esther Berkowitz-Caballero, Note, In
the Aftermath of Gentile: Reconsidering the Efficacy of Trial Publicity Rules, 68
N.Y.U. L. REV. 494, 530-31 (1993) (suggesting that the publicity rules sometimes are
enforced, but only selectively and potentially discriminatorily).
126. For a description of "fictions" about the codes that lawyers might assert to
shield their conduct, see infra part III.E.
127. See generally Kaplan, supra note 84 (addressing the question of why lawyers
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answer, that "the legal system depends on everyone being represented," never seems to satisfy the questioner, for the questioner
himself would never take the evil client's side. Laypersons, perhaps, cannot understand the essence of role-differentiation-the
need for lawyers to consider long-term systemic interests in
making individual moral choices.12 8
Lawyers, in turn, sometimes forget that systemic interests do
not outweigh all other societal values.129 Even the issue of
whether to accept a client is not always obvious. Clients may be
entitled to some lawyer to achieve some purposes, but this entitlement does not mean that a particular client deserves a particular lawyer or that the lawyer should be willing to do all
kinds of legal work for the client. 3 ' Laypersons are justified in
questioning lawyers who, without thought, sell their services as
"hired guns."
Once they accept clients, some lawyers assume that their sole
mission is to maximize the clients' chances of obtaining their desired results. This approach overlooks the possibility that lawyers can exercise objective judgment as to the merits of a client's
desires, at least in giving the client advice to avoid or desist
from pursuing wrongful positions.' 3 ' Many laypersons probably
would take the analysis one step further. Arguably, lawyers
should not be willing to help clients manipulate the law to
achieve a result to which, objectively, the clients are not legally
entitled. Criminal defense lawyers should not provide information that would help a client perjure himself or concoct a

should represent guilty criminal defendants).
128. See Post, supra note 116, at 380 (discussing the public's inability to appreciate
the lawyer's ambivalent role).
129. See MANN, supra note 56, at 120 ("Deeply imbedded in [the studied] attorneys
is the idea of an adversary as a person who settles doubt in favor of his client, and
therefore . . . looks for doubt and uses what may appear to be doubtful techniques
and doubtful strategies, because it is part of his professional mandate."); Subin,
supra note 97, at 14547 (arguing that the right to put on a defense is not absolute
and that there are limits to a client's right to autonomy).
130. Even Monroe Freedman, the leader of the school of thought urging client-orientation, is quick to note lawyers' ability, and even responsibility, to reject cases
they do not feel comfortable advocating. FREEDMAN, supra note 9, at 49-50, 57, 6671; see also authorities cited supra note 54.
131. For a detailed discussion of the process of "moral dialogue" with clients, see
infra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
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defense. 3 ' Civil litigators should not harass or intimidate opposing parties into conceding for nonsubstantive reasons.'3 3
Lawyers should not rely on false inferences or attempt to win by
falsely casting doubt on truthful witnesses.1 4 To the extent
that lawyers contribute to clients' ability to achieve wrongful results, society perceives lawyers as a problem rather than a positive force.
How do the codes address these subjects? They again are
silent or ambiguous. The codes say nothing about which clients
lawyers should agree to represent, beyond noting that lawyers
should help assure that legal services are generally available.135 The codes hope that lawyers will remonstrate with
clients and dissuade them from acting unreasonably, but do not
require it.' 36 They allow lawyers to choose among tactics and to
132. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 56, at 15 (condemning the practice of lawyers
who provide clients with information that helps them commit perjury); Albert W.
Alschuler, The Preservation of a Client's Confidences: One Value Among Many or a
Categorical Imperative?, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 349, 349-50 (1981) (discussing the view
that a lawyer should reveal a client's confidences when the client has committed
perjury).
133. The classic examples of such conduct include using depositions of parties to
inquire into demeaning or embarrassing information and impeaching the credibility
of truthful witnesses by using cross-examination material that is of marginal relevance. See, e.g., MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE
DALKON SHIELD 194-95 (1985) (alleging questionable tactics on the part of defense
lawyers in the Dalkon Shield class action suit).
134. Compare Lawry, supra note 15, at 347-49 (discussing cross-examination of
truthful witnesses) and Subin, supra note 80, at 126-27 (questioning techniques that
give rise to false inferences) with John B. Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts Are Where
You Find Them: A Response to Professor Subin's Position on the Criminal Lawyer's
"Different Mission", 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 339, 340-43 (1987) (challenging Subin's
position in the criminal defense context) and Kaplan, supra note 84, at 247
(challenging Subin's position, with qualifications).
135. MODEL RULES, Rule 6.1, ("A lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours
of pro bono publico legal services per year"); id. cmt. ("Every lawyer . . . has a responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay"); MODEL CODE EC 2-25
(1983) ("Every lawyer ...
should find time to participate in serving the disadvantaged."); id. EC 8-3 (discussing lawyers' role in improving the legal system).
136. One of the arguments frequently raised in support of the codes' strict formulation of attorney-client confidentiality is that confidentiality encourages clients to tell
lawyers of potential wrongdoing, and lawyers thus will be able to dissuade the clients from engaging in the planned conduct. See Zacharias, supra note 73, at 369-70
(discussing the rationale that attorney-client confidentiality aids in the prevention of
client misconduct); see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981)
(discussing the importance of promoting compliance with the law as a primary justi-
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refrain "from press[ing] for every advantage"'37 but also leave
to the clients the decision of whether third-party interests
should take precedence.' 38 Although the codes forbid lawyers to
participate in criminal or fraudulent activity,'39 they do not
that
prevent lawyers from giving clients information or advice
4
enables the clients to engage in misconduct on their own. 1
Typically, the lawyer's self-interest will be to align her own
thinking with a client's wishes.' 4 ' A policy of accepting all clients who can pay maximizes the lawyer's financial interests.
Blind obedience to the client's wishes regarding objectives and
strategy keeps the lawyer in the client's good graces, so long as
the client's approach is not tactically erroneous. Providing advice
that enables the client to serve his self-interest, even if the lawyer could not take the same action, helps prove to the client that
the lawyer is on his side and deserves compensation for loyalty.
Under the codes, lawyers have the option of exercising objective,
independent judgment regarding the propriety of the client, his
goals, and his actions. Practical considerations, however, militate
against implementing the option and encourage lawyers to adopt
principles of zeal and blind partisanship as their prime directives.

fication for the attorney-client privilege); MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 cmt. (justifying

strict confidentiality on the grounds that otherwise the client would be "inhibited
from revealing facts which would enable the lawyer to counsel against a wrongful
course of action").
137. MODEL RULES Rule 1.3 cmt. ("A] lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client."); see also MODEL CODE EC 7-10 (noting
limits to duty of zeal).
138. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 1.2 cmt. (requiring lawyer to defer to client "regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons
who might be adversely affected"); MODEL CODE EC 7-8 ("In the final analysis .. .
whether to forego legally available objectives or methods because of non-legal factors
is ultimately for the client.").
139. MODEL RULES Rules 1.2(d), 8.4(b)-(c); MODEL CODE DR 1-102(A)(3)-(4),

7-

102(A)(7).
140. Indeed, the codes seem to encourage lawyers to provide clients with full information. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 1.4(b) (requiring lawyers to inform clients sufficiently to make informed decisions regarding the representation). Contra id. Rule 3.3
cmt. (requiring lawyers to remedy client peijury).
141. See JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS 66-71 (1966) (discussing an empirical
study concluding that clients have significant influence over lawyers' ethical thinking
and conduct); Gordon, supra note 12, at 34-35 (discussing institutional conditions
under which "[i]ndependence in the [clourse of Ir]epresentation" is possible).
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C. Employing Proper Tactics To Help Clients Commit New
Wrongful Acts
The literature on zealous advocacy often fails to distinguish
among the many roles lawyers play.' Even if one accepts the
premise that advocates must employ all permissible tactics to
help a client win litigation, lawyers need not apply the same
principle in nonlitigation contexts.
In part, the societal view of lawyers as "hired guns" stems
from the perception that lawyers are willing to use the law affirmatively to help clients commit wrongful acts. Clients and attorneys today routinely assume that tax lawyers should help clients
circumvent their tax obligations, that lawyers for regulated
industries should help clients avoid onerous but legitimate regulatory requirements, and that the commercial bar should manipulate corporate structures to minimize clients' liability and
regulatory obligations.'
Should lawyers in these advice set-

142. In recent years, a few commentators have urged reconsideration of uniform
ethical analysis of lawyers engaging in different types of practice. See, e.g.,
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 58-68 (1978) (noting a
need to acknowledge different roles of lawyers); Stephen B, Burbank, State Ethical
Codes and Federal Practice: Emerging Conflicts and Suggestions for Reform, 19
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 969, 975 (1992) (suggesting that we have "begun to acknowledge" the significance of different roles); Teresa S. Collett, And the Two Shall Become As One . . . Until the Lawyers Are Done, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POLY 101, 141-43 (1993) (questioning the adequacy of the Model Rules' models of
representation); Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline in 2050: A Look Back, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 129-31 (1991) (predicting that future regulation will take a
new approach to the role of "entity lawyers"); Stanley Sporkin, The Need for Separate Codes of Professional Conduct for the Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 149 (1993) (discussing the need for separate ethical rules in corporate and securities law); Fred C. Zacharias, Fact and Fiction in the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: Should the Confidentiality Provisions Restate the Law?, 6 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 903, 930 (1993) [hereinafter Zacharias, Fact and Fiction] (calling upon
rulemakers to better acknowledge lawyers' differing roles); Fred C. Zacharias, The
Restatement and Confidentiality, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 73, 85 (1993) [hereinafter Zacharias, The Restatement] (same); cf Bruce A. Green, A Prosecutor's Communications with
Defendants: What Are the Limits?, 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 283, 313-20 (1988) (arguing
that prosecutors' ethical obligations should vary, depending upon the role the prosecutor plays).
143. See, e.g., MANN, supra note 56, at 3-4 (discussing representation in tax and
securities fraud cases); The Avoidance Dynamic: A Tale of Tax Planning, Tax Ethics,
and Tax Reform, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1553 (George Cooper, ed., 1980) (discussing the
lawyer's role in tax planning); Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye, Scholer: En-
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tings do more to encourage clients to fulfill their "moral" or
"societal" obligations?
The codes, again, send mixed signals. The same elements of
zealousness and client orientation that govern litigation seem to
apply in advice and transactional contexts. So long as lawyers
themselves do not commit or participate in committing wrongful
acts,' the codes impose no direct obligation to avoid helping
clients take advantage of law. On the other hand, a liberal interpretation of rules prohibiting "assisting unlawful conduct" would
suggest that lawyers should refrain from much activity 1that
45
helps clients circumvent civil or criminal legal requirements.
How will lawyers act if left to their own devices?'46 Under

listing Lawyers to Improve the Regulation of Financial Institutions, 66 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1019, 1055-61 (1993) (discussing possible effects of the Kaye, Scholer case on
lawyers' attitudes towards their role in representing clients before administrative
agencies); Lawry, supra note 15, at 353 (discussing propriety of finding tax loopholes
for clients); Pepper, supra note 20, at 627-33 (discussing a lawyer's duty to help a
client who engages in pollution that violates regulatory requirements).
144. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(a)(2) ("A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . fail
to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client."); id. Rule 8.4(b) ("It is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to . . . commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer."); MODEL CODE DR 1102(A)(3) ("A lawyer shall not . . . engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.").
145. Arguably, providing legal assistance fits the terms of the rule, even though the
legal assistance itself might be perfectly lawful. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 353 (1987) (noting that "assisting" in Model
Rule 3.3(a)(2) is "not limited to the criminal law concepts of aiding and abetting,"
but "rather . . . is intended to guide the conduct of the lawyer as an officer of the
court"); cf Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse & Cold Storage Co., 571 F. Supp. 507,
512 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (extrapolating from the spirit of the codes to find a general
duty of lawyer candor with respect to "significant" matters that would affect the decisions of the opposing party); Fellerman v. Bradley, 493 A.2d 1239, 1245 (N.J. 1985)
(quoting In re Callan, 300 A.2d 868, 877 (N.J. Super. 1973)) (defining fraud for
purposes of crime-fraud exception to privilege as including "confederating with clients
to allow a court and counsel to labor under a misapprehension"). Most lawyers,
however, reject such a broad interpretation of the term "assistance." See MANN,
supra note 56, at 24647 (discussing lawyers' narrow view of prohibitions against
"assistance in illegal conduct").
146. Because lawyers hesitate to expose their conduct and client confidences to
public view, concrete studies on this subject are rare. One available study of whitecollar criminal defense lawyers shows that lawyers routinely avoid knowledge of
ongoing criminal activity, in order to sidestep the quandary of whether to help the
client, withdraw, or report the criminal conduct.) MANN, supra note 56, at 103.
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Thurman Arnold's encapsulation of legal ethics- [i]f it comes
down to whether [he goes] to jail or [his] client does, [he'll] make
sure it's the client"4'--a lawyer will demur when helping a
client achieve wrongful ends might subject the lawyer to criminal or civil liability. 148 In other circumstances, however, the
lawyer has everything to gain from helping the client.'49 Not
only does the representation increase business, but the client
becomes tied to the lawyer in the future because of the hold created by the client's realization that the lawyer is familiar with
the client's questionable activities. In extreme situations, the
lawyer may recognize a moral cost to representing the client in
these activities. 50 As a psychological counterbalance, however,
a sense of loyalty and "team spirit" may encourage her to rationalize the validity of the client's ends.
D. Employing Marginal Tactics
Thus far, this Article only has considered the use of legal
practices and tactics that are lawful and sometimes unquestionably appropriate. However, in the view of some observers, the
so-called decline in legal professionalism has been hastened by
lawyers' willingness to embrace tactics that themselves are improper--or at least on the margin of propriety.'' Such tactics
147. HAZARD, supra note 142, at 86 (quoting Thurman Arnold).
148. This attitude prompted the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) to focus on the
bar in enforcing banking regulations. By seizing a law firm's assets in the Kaye,
Scholer case, OTS held lawyers responsible for representations made to regulators on
their clients' behalf and thereby deterred future misrepresentations by banking attorneys. For a description of the events leading up to the seizure, see Dennis E.
Curtis, Old Knights and New Champions: Kaye, Scholer, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Pursuit of the Dollar, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 985, 991-96 (1993) (discussing
OTS charges against Kaye, Scholer); Joyce A. Hughes, Law Firm Kaye, Scholer,
Lincoln S&L and the OTS, 7 NOTRE- DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoL'Y 177 (1993);
Charles R. Zubrzycki, Note, The Kaye, Scholer Case: Attorneys' Ethical Duties to
Third Parties in Regulatory Situations, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 977 (1993) (outlining
the charges and claims in Kaye, Scholer).
149. Cf. MANN, supra note 56, at 246 ("[D]efense attorneys have adopted a role in
representing clients that excuses them from knowledge of the causal connection between what they say and what their clients do, where the clients' actions are not
more than a reasonable possibility.").
150. Cf. Gilson, supra note 96, at 887-88 (noting the reality that lawyers sometimes
have acted contrary to their apparent economic self-interest); Gordon, supra note 12,
at 40 (recognizing instances where lawyers have sacrificed income).
151. See, e.g., Cook, supra note 10, at 969-80 (discussing "Rambo litigation's" nega-
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include raising insupportable defenses and privileges, threatening or blackmailing witnesses or adversaries into cooperating,
filing false claims to gain a negotiating advantage, and submitting technically accurate but misleading information in response
to discovery requests and government filing requirements.1 52
The codes forbid most of these tactics. However, the prohibitions are in most instances tempered by caveats that enable
lawyers to justify ignoring the prohibitions. The rules against
raising frivolous claims and arguments are qualified, so that if
some nonfrivolous justification can be imagined the rules are not
violated."5 3 Similarly, the rules against threatening third parties with lawsuits are limited in scope and offer easily-triggered
exceptions."5 Lawyers committed to the model of partisanship

tive effects on the legal system and society's view of legal professionalism); cf ABA,
A LAWYERS' CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM (1988) (nonbinding policy urging restraint in
use of hardball tactics).
The propriety of some tactics provokes disagreement among lawyers, but may
produce common ground when the lawyers actually think about the tactics. For example, John Kaplan, and others, defend the criminal defense lawyer's right to crossexamine and cast doubt on truthful prosecution witnesses as supporting the function
of "checking" the government's proof. Kaplan, supra note 84, at 247; see also Fried,
supra note 4, at 1086 (arguing that the system envisages skeptical examination even
of truthful witnesses); Mitchell, supra note 84, at 298 (discussing the criminal defense lawyer's "screening" function); cf ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-7.6 (1991) (allowing defense lawyers to
discredit truthful witnesses); Subin, supra note 97, at 128 (arguing that a lawyer
should not discredit the testimony of a witness he knows to be truthful). However,
even Kaplan expresses disapproval when lawyers carry this practice beyond the
"checking function" by attributing moral delinquency to the witness. Kaplan, supra
note 84, at 248-49; see also Lawry, supra note 15, at 344-45 (approving cross-examination of the substance of truthful witness's testimony, but disapproving cross-examination consisting of a personal attack on the witness); cf Uviller, supra note 97, at
1076-82 (arguing in a variety of contexts that lawyers may present a false case but
should not in any way express their own opinion or omit information "which if stated might reasonably alter the meaning or significance of the testimony").
152. A prime example of lawyers asserting unsupportable positions is the practice
by lawyers subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury regarding unprivileged matters
(e.g., fees received) of asserting that they are somehow immune from testifying. See
Fred C. Zacharias, A Critical Look at Rules Governing Grand Jury Subpoenas of
Attorneys, 76 MINN. L. REV. 917, 919-21 (1992) (discussing situations in which lawyer testimony is unprivileged) and authorities cited therein.
153. MODEL RULES Rule 3.1; MODEL CODE DR 7-102(A)(1)-(2).
154. The Model Code for example, prohibits lawyers from threatening to present
criminal charges. MODEL CODE DR 7-105(A). But the prohibition is limited to situations in which the sole purpose of the threat is "to obtain an advantage in a civil
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therefore can ordinarily interpret the codes to offer a choice
between desisting from the tactics or finding that client needs
justify the tactics.
To the extent that the prohibitive rules are enforced or extradisciplinary sanctions can be invoked, lawyers have reason to
obey the rules.'5 5 However, as with the other practices discussed above, nothing in the general ethos of modern lawyering
encourages them to desist from the practices. In the world of
hardball lawyering, maximizing all activities that help clients
serves lawyers' economic156 interests and psychologically is the
most comfortable course.
E. Conclusions
Consider these common statements by lawyers whose hardball
tactics are questioned:
(1) "I was just representing my client."
(2) "I have a duty to be zealous on behalf of my client."
(3) "The codes require me to inform my client of all his
options; the decisions are his."
Or these statements by lawyers whose decisions to assert

matter." The code does not forbid threatening civil suit or filing administrative complaints. The Model Rules take no position on this issue.
155. See Zacharias, supra note 6, at 251-53 (discussing the likely effects of unenforced code provisions). For example, FED. R. Civ. P. 11 imposes penalties upon
lawyers for making bad faith arguments that might previously have been allowed
because the lawyers could identify some nonfrivolous basis for the arguments. Judging from the outcry over Rule 11, lawyers are trying to abide by the rule's mandates. However, they do so for fear of punishment, rather than because their ethos
has changed; the professional codes in most states maintain the conception that
lawyers may make any argument for which some basis exists, even if the true motive may be harassment or delay. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.1 (authorizing all arguments with nonfrivolous components); MODEL CODE DR 7-102(A)(1)-(2) (forbidding
claims that serve "merely to harass" and authorizing "unwarranted" claims supportable by some "good faith argument").
156. Because prosecutors do not have individual clients, economic incentives should
not cause them to abdicate their discretion to "do justice." See MODEL RULES Rule
3.8 cmt. (describing prosecutors as "minister[s] of justice"); MODEL CODE EC 7-13
(requiring prosecutors to "seek justice"). However, in a previous article, I have noted
that psychological and institutional incentives often encourage prosecutors to employ
an exaggerated adversarial approach to litigation. Zacharias, supra note 76, at 10709.
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questionable claims or arguments or to delay litigation are challenged:
(4) "Because the interrogation might conceivably have
led to relevant information, I had a duty to my client to
make sure."
(5) "I must make all arguments that have any chance of
winning."
(6) "My client has a right to make all possible arguments."
Or these standard responses to the claim that the lawyer has
misled a jury or court:
(7) "It is my obligation to make the government (or
adversary) prove its case."
(8) "There is no such thing as fact in the courtroom, only
information, missing information, and inferences to be
drawn from information. The lawyer's job is to put the
best light on the information that is produced."
Each of these statements suggests that the lawyer had no
discretion to act differently. Each suggests that the ethics of the
profession-the codes-required her conduct. Many of the statements are true, as far as they go. Yet, as discussed, the codes in
fact accord lawyers significant choice in selecting tactics, screening arguments, and presenting accurate versions of the facts.
The frequency with which lawyers make the above assertions
demonstrates that lawyers have come to use the model of clientoriented ethics as a shield, both for defending behavior and for
avoiding introspection regarding moral issues." '

157. In his empirical study of white-collar criminal defense lawyers, Charles Mann
quotes one lawyer's approach as follows:
It's my mission and obligation to defend the client, not to sit in moral,
ethical, or legal judgment of him. I cannot join him in transgressing the
law, but whatever he does of his own impetus . . . is a decision he has
to make independent of what I do. I must inform him of the consequences and significance of his action but . . . [mly role in the adversary system is to protect him.
MANN, supra note 56, at 121; see Green, supra note 85, at 710-11 (suggesting that
in order to attract clients, some lawyers interpret the duty of zeal to require taking
all lawful steps to advance their clients interests); Edwin H. Greenebaum, Attorneys'
Problems in Making Ethical Decisions, 52 IND. L.J. 627, 630 (1977) ("The traditions
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For purposes of analysis, let us assume that the lawyer making each of the above statements has acted only after making an
objectively-reasoned decision to exercise her discretion in this
way. What would one expect her to say?
Statements (1)-(3) might be formulated like this: "After weighing my obligations to advocate my client's case zealously and the
third-party interests, and after discussing the options with my
client, we determined thE.t the most appropriate course was to
do X." Statements (4)-(6) might become: "The arguments we
pursued represented legitimate and reasonable legal claims that,
under the adversarial system, we felt needed to be pressed both
to vindicate my client's right to a full hearing and to give the
court the benefit of a strong adversarial presentation of the
merits." Statements (7)-(8) might be reformulated as follows:
"We neither made false statements nor misrepresented the facts.
The evidence presented supported our claim that the government [or our adversary] had failed to carry their burden of proof
and we decided that it was important to point that out for the
jury."
I do not suggest that there is any virtue simply in having
lawyers put a better public face on what they have done. I present these formulations simply to demonstrate what lawyers
would have to say to reflect their obligations honestly. Moreover,
if lawyers truly were implementing the objectivity aspects of
professional ethics, these formulations represent how lawyers
would think about their obligations. The fact that one rarely
hears these alternative statements-that lawyers more commonly insist that the codes mandate their actions-illustrates that
lawyers are failing to take the codes' grant of objective discretion
adequately into account.

of the profession do provide rationalizations for those who would abandon their own
judgment to that of the group."); cf Michael D. Bayles, Professionals, Clients, and
Others, in PROFITS, supra note 11, at 65 (noting that typically, so long as a lawyer's
actions are legally permissible, the lawyer holds out her duty to her client as superseding other duties to third parties); Buchanan, supra note 28, at 567 ("Many lawyers excuse deceptive, hyperaggressive, and otherwise reprehensible behavior as doing their utmost for their client."); Fried, supra note 4, at 1087-89 (arguing that a
lawyer may do anything within the bounds of the law to assist a client and still
remain "moral"); Charles W. Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 809, 839
(1977) (discussing lawyers' use of confidentiality as a shield).
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IV. APPROACHES TO REINTRODUCING OBJECTIVITY INTO
PRACTICE
Thus far, this Article has demonstrated that lawyers have
incentives to practice unfettered client orientation and that,
partly for historical reasons, many lawyers prefer this emphasis
to a routine in which they must evaluate moral and tactical
issues objectively.' 58 That leaves the question of how the profession should react. In most instances, the codes already allow
lawyers to act objectively. Sometimes the codes require it. If the
pendulum, indeed, has swung from insufficient to excessive
client orientation, how can the profession produce a new balance? The following Section suggests institutional changes that
may help reintroduce objectivity into the lawyer's role.
Initially, though, consider the nature of ethics rules. Professional regulation addresses two ,sets of problems: controlling
lawyers who may take advantage of clients and guiding lawyers
in balancing client interests against third-party and societal
interests. Addressing the first set of problems is relatively easy
for code-drafters. They simply must do their best to identify how
most people in society believe lawyers should act and reduce
those preferences to rules. The second set of problems presents
more of a quandary, because the interests in maintaining an
efficient adversary system, achieving just results, and honoring
client dignity and autonomy often conflict. Code-drafters recognize that reasonable people differ on the appropriate balance of
interests, and so cannot write rules that reflect a consensus.' 59
The drafters have tended to rely on rules that illustrate conflict-

158. Cf Terrell & Wildman, supra note 10, at 415 (noting that increasingly a
lawyer's quality is measured by her ability to get things done for the client, rather
than by her professionalism). I do not mean to suggest that all lawyers follow this
approach, simply that the problem is sufficient to warrant regulatory attention. Indeed, some lawyers engage in problematic conduct at the other extreme of the spectrum; namely, manipulating clients into taking positions that the lawyers prefer, for
personal or economic reasons. See generally Russel G. Pearce, Family Values and
Legal Ethics: Competing Approaches to Conflicts in Representing Spouses, 62
FORDHAM1 L. REV. 1253, 1306 n.361 (1994) (describing the problem of manipulation
by lawyers and citing empirical evidence of such practices). Most professional responsibility experts would agree that lying to and manipulating clients falls outside any
reasonable conception of the lawyer's role.
159. Zacharias, supra note 6, at 258.
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ing values, call on lawyers to address those values internally,
and grant lawyers discretion to make difficult choices on a case
by case basis.' 6 '
The development of the bar's current ethos demonstrates that
one can always rely on economic and reputational incentives to
affect the choices that lawyers make. 6 ' The increasingly competitive marketplace for lawyers heightens the effect of economic
concerns." 2 If professional rulemakers nonetheless expect ethics codes to influence lawyers to engage in fair introspection, the

160. See id. at 257-65 (discussing the guidance function of ethics codes); cf.
Greenebaum, supra note 157, at 631 (noting lawyers' difficulty in "knowling] when
they are being appropriately humble in giving deference to group norms and when
they are merely avoiding responsibility or being personally prudential").
161. See, e.g., CARLIN, supra note 141, at 66-71 (discussing empirical study showing
that economic incentives of lawyers significantly affect their ethical conduct); cf
Gilson, supra note 96, at 889-93, 899 (arguing that clients do not always have the
information or economic leverage that would cause lawyers to refrain from exercising
objective judgment); Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 665
(1990) (discussing an empirical study showing that self-interest often induces lawyers
to lie even to their own clients, in clear violation of ethical standards).
162. Although law has always been a business, there is little doubt that competition has changed the industry. The bar has expanded, stable firm structures are a
thing of the past, and job tenure within law firms has all but disappeared. See
Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm:
The Economics of Associate Career Patterns, 41 STAN. L. REV. 567, 586-93 (1989)
(discussing*changing career patterns of associates in law firms); Ronald J. Gilson &
Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry
into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313,
314-16 (1985) (discussing the changing economics of and increasing instability in law
firms); cf ROBERT W. HILLMAN, LAW FIRM BREAKUPS (1990) (treatise devoted entirely to the law and legal practice relating to the breakup of law firms); Demetrios
Dimitriou, The Individual Practitioner and Commercialism in the Profession: How
Can the Individual Survive?, 45 S.C. L. REV. 965 (1994) (relating changes in the
economies of legal practice to lawyer and client perceptions of which practices by
lawyers are appropriate).
If the changes in practice alone explain the decrease in lawyer objectivity, the
focus of this Article may be misplaced. In other words, the greater the impact of
economic incentives, the less likely it becomes that changes in the ethos of professionalism can counteract those incentives. See Gilson, supra note 96, at 900-03 (identifying the expansion of the role of in-house general counsel as the reason for the
decrease in corporate lawyers' ability to exercise independent judgment). Among the
solutions proposed in section IV of this Article, only entity liability could be expected
to have a significant impact upon lawyer conduct. This Article assumes, however,
that a combination of factors is at work. On that assumption, the norms that guide
the bar (including both code requirements and conventions) remain important factors
in controlling the conduct of the profession as a whole.
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rules must counteract lawyers' instincts.'6 3 That is not to say
that ethics codes necessarily should forbid the conduct towards
which economic and reputational incentives drive lawyers. Rather, the codes should seek mechanisms to force lawyers to separate their assessment of values from their personal interests.'6 4
With that premise in mind, we can proceed to consider what
changes in the ethics codes and what other avenues of professional regulation might effectively promote lawyer objectivity.
A. Clarifying Limits on Client Orientation
One of the defects in the prevailing regulation is that, although it allows lawyers to take a moral stand, it also allows
lawyers to abdicate their discretion. For example, code provisions that state "lawyers need not press for every advantage"
probably were intended to include the mandatory implications
that (1) sometimes lawyers should not press for every advantage, and (2) in close situations, lawyers always should consider
not pressing for every advantage. By selecting permissive terminology, the codes free lawyers to ignore the implications on
the basis that they are secondary to obligations of zeal.'65
Before the profession can begin to deal with the problems of
educating lawyers on exercising objectivity and assuring that
attorney-client relationships remain cemented, it must confront
the tension between the tradition of client-oriented "zeal" and
objectivity. As long as lawyers can effortlessly adopt different
views of appropriate advocacy, competition will force most lawyers to adopt conventions minimizing objectivity.'6 6 The codes

163. Cf Schneyer, supra note 7, at 1543-44 (arguing that "financial, psychological,
and organizational pressures" account for most overzealous lawyering and that the
codes are "designed to discourage such behavior").
164. Rules that allow lawyers to engage in particular conduct but require that the
lawyers first take precautionary steps (e.g., put item in writing, obtain client consent) already encompass the goal of making lawyers consider the propriety of their
conduct. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 1.9 (allowing a lawyer to engage in representation involving potential conflicts of interests when a client consents).
165. See Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of ProfessionalResponsibility, 90
HARv. L. REV. 702, 736 (1977) (noting that any creative lawyer can easily circumvent the antidelay and antiharassment rule).
166. See Shuchman, supra note 91, at 126 (discussing four economic "conditions"
that must exist before lawyers would be willing to adopt informal conventions mini-
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thus must identify which obligations, if any, conflict with and
take precedence over client desires."' The profession also
needs to establish mechanisms by which the benefits of zealous
advocacy can be maintained but through which lawyers can
separate their moral decisionmaking from partisan practice.'68
Finally, the profession must develop counterincentives to balance lawyers' natural inclinations to give the client whatever he
desires.
The codes already include several principles that identify
some duty to act objectively, although in practice these principles are obscured. Lawyers may not engage in illegal conduct. ' 9 They should not assist clients in accomplishing illegal
or fraudulent conduct.' ° They are forbidden to lie to third parties or the court.'' Moreover, many codes include catch-all provisions forbidding lawyers to engage in conduct "involving dishonesty,"'7 2 to continue representation that is "materially limited ... by the lawyer's own interests,"' 3 or to pursue objec-

mizing deceit).
167. See generally MANN, supra note 56, at 248 (arguing for more specificity in the
rules limiting attorney zeal); Morgan, supra note 165, at 734-39 (arguing that current rules do not do enough to limit attorney zeal).
For example, both model codes recognize interests that may come into tension
with the interests underlying attorney-client confidentiality. See MODEL RULES Rule
1.6(b) (identifying permissive exceptions to confidentiality rule); MODEL CODE DR 4101(C) (identifying permissive exceptions). However, the purely permissive nature of
the confidentiality exceptions fails to provide any guidance on how lawyers should
resolve the tension. Cf MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(b) (requiring disclosure of confidences
when necessary to counteract client perjury).
168. In a recent article, Donald Langevoort applies research in the field of social
cognition to the subject of lawyer participation in client fraud. Langevoort, supra
note 4. Langevoort concludes that once a lawyer commits herself to representing a
client, it becomes psychologically difficult for the lawyer to perceive red flags highlighting client misconduct. Id. at 102-03. Langevoort therefore analyzes institutional
devices that may overcome some of these "cognitive biases." Id. at 113-14.
169. MODEL RULES Rule 8.4(b); MODEL CODE DR 1-102(A)(3).
170. MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(d); MODEL CODE DR 7-102(A)(7).
171. MODEL RULES Rules 3.3(a)(1), 4.1; MODEL CODE DR 7-102(A)(5).
172. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 8.4(c) (A lawyer shall not "engage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation"); MODEL CODE DR 1102(A)(4) (same requirement); see also id. DR 1-102(A)(6) ("[A] lawyer shall not engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.").
173. MODEL RULES Rule 1.7(b); see also MODEL CODE EC 5-2 (providing that a
lawyer shall not accept employment when personal interests or desires may affect
the advice she will give).
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tives that "the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent."' 4 In
light of the way lawyers have come to view these prohibitions,
the principles deserve clarification.
Early in the Model Rules for example, one finds the call to
client orientation: "a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions
concerning the objectives of representation."1 75 The primary
limitations on lawyer conduct appear far later, in the withdrawal section' 6 and the penultimate, "misconduct" section of the
Rules.' If indeed there is a need to counteract lawyers' tendencies to minimize the duty to maintain objectivity, that duty
should be introduced as a first principle together with the code's
initial reference to client orientation.
More importantly, to avoid rationalizing behavior, ambiguity
in the terms of the principles must be removed.'7 8 The codes
might inform lawyers at the outset that, although the codes
include an emphasis on partisan advocacy of client interests,
lawyers may not assume that the duty of zealous advocacy overrides other obligations. In prohibiting lawyers to "engage" in
illegal or dishonest conduct, lawyers should be informed that
dishonest conduct includes lawyering tactics; 7 9 the mere fact
that a lawyer conducts the activity on the client's behalf does
not justify it. Similarly, code references to "assisting" clients in
accomplishing illegal, dishonest, or morally repugnant objectives
should be broadly defined. 8 ' Throughout, the codes must cau174. MODEL RULES Rule 1.16(b)(3) (1993) (allowing withdrawal).
175. Id. Rule 1.2(a).
176. See id. Rule 1.16(c) (allowing withdrawal when client's objectives are repugnant).
177. Id. Rule 8.4 (describing conduct in which lawyers may not engage).
178. See MANN, supra note 56, at 245-46, 248 (suggesting that, to the extent codes
leave any ambiguity in how certain lawyers should be before considering themselves
aware of client wrongdoing, lawyers will feel compelled to interpret the codes as
justifying assistance to their clients); Subin, supra note 55, at 1135-36 (dismissing
the claim that lawyers rarely can know when facts are truthful).
179. For example, the types of misrepresentation discussed in MANN, supra note 56,
at 16-18.
180. See, e.g., Lawry, supra note 15, at 321 (noting that the prohibition on illegal
conduct "istoo often superficially understood only as a constraint on representational
behavior, something to be gotten around if possible by guile or brute force"); cf Joel
S. Newman, Legal Advice Toward Illegal Ends, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 287, 301-03
(1994) (relying on case law to argue that something more than mere advice must be
present before a lawyer can be held to have given assistance to a client in breaking
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tion lawyers against interpreting limitations on their behavior
too narrowly or legalistically. Thus, for example, a prohibition on
"false statements" 8 ' should clearly encompass misrepresentations, intentionally misleading statements, fraud, and direct
lies." 2 Counterindications should be removed."8 3
One cause of the bar's recent tendency to read ambiguity into
code prohibitions is the tension between the bar's own vision of
how the law should apply to the bar and the vision of courts and
legislatures.'8 4 A prime example is the dichotomy between Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which prohibits
pleadings made for any improper purpose, and the parallel ethical provisions that forbid making arguments and claims solely
for an improper purpose.'8 5 Although Rule 11 applies only in
federal civil litigation and only with respect to pleadings, it is
becoming the dominant vision.' Perhaps it is time for ethics

the law).
181. E.g., MODEL RULES Rules 3.3(a)(1), 4.1; MODEL CODE DR 7-102(A)(5).
182. See W. William Hodes, Two Cheers for Lying (About Immaterial Matters),
PROF. LAW., May 1994, at 1, 4 (arguing against strengthening Model Rule 3.3, but
calling for broad interpretation of what constitutes a "material misrepresentation"
under the rule); cf Guernsey, supra note 102, at 103, 125 (arguing that practical
difficulties inherent in requiring truthfulness militate in favor of a standard encouraging all parties to disregard anything lawyers say in negotiations).
183. As noted, lawyers' natural incentives cause them to seize upon such invitations to mislead as the comments to MODEL RULES Rule 4.1, which condone
"puffing" and misrepresentations that comport with "convention."
184. Susan Koniak has provided examples of ethics regulation that demonstrate the
bar's tendency to advocate a different view of lawyers' rights and obligations than
that to which courts and legislatures adhere. See generally Susan P. Koniak, The
Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389 (1992). Koniak suggests
that the legal profession expects its view to trump, or govern, contra-indications in
the substantive law. Id. at 1416-27.
185. Compare FED. R. CIv. P. 11(b) (1993) ("The signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certificate . . . that the pleading, motion, or other paper . . . is not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.") with MODEL RULES Rule 3.1
(stating that a lawyer may make any "nonfrivolous" argument) and MODEL CODE DR
7-102(A)-(B) (stating that a lawyer may not take action serving "merely to harass or
maliciously injure another," but may make any argument that "can be supported by
a good faith argument").
186. Even state court litigators must consider Rule 11's mandates because state
cases often are removed to federal court and the lawyers initially may not know
where their cases will be filed. Zacharias, supra note 92, at 367-68; see also Judith
A. McMorrow, Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, 2 B.Y.U. L. REV. 959, 970

1995]

PROFESSIONALISM AND CLIENT INTERESTS

1357

code drafters to align their standards with Rule 11 for all contexts.
Revising the codes' standards for advocacy would neither chill
energetic lawyering nor eliminate slick lawyers' ability to make
87
questionable arguments while hiding their improper purpose.
As Ted Schneyer recently has pointed out, inherent practical and
theoretical features of "professional self-regulation" limit the ability of ethics codes to influence behavior.' However, modifying the
codes' standards would recognize that only by framing rules to
counteract lawyers' natural partisanship can the codes hope to
encourage lawyers to exercise self-restraint. Moreover, harmonizing the codes with Rule 11 would make it easier for lawyers to explain, and clients to understand, the limits on proper advocacy.
This, in turn, may reduce the pressures that clients place on lawyers to abdicate their discretion.
B. Codifying the Duties To Engage in Moral Discourse and
Introspection
In addition to clarifying existing requirements of lawyer independence, the codes might make explicit several considerations
underlying those provisions which allocate lawyer and client responsibility and which call for lawyer-client "communication."'8 9 Even when codes give clients authority to insist on
tactics that cause delay or injure third parties, 9 ' the codes
probably should instruct lawyers not to assume that clients
always want the lawyers to use those tactics.' 9 ' Similarly, law(1991) (describing increasing federal influence on state codes).
187. Rule 11 itself does not appear to have significantly chilled viable claims. If it
has such an effect, the primary reason is the Rule's self-enforcing nature; adversaries have an incentive to raise and litigate violations in order to obtain monetary
compensation. See Melissa L. Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot?
Looking for a Middle Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 383, 394
(1990) (noting that the advisory committee's hope that the 1983 amendments to Rule
11 would not "chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity" is undermined by large
fee shifting awards and the award of attorney fees that are available to successful
Rule 11 litigants). In contrast, the main effect of a revised ethics standard would be
to prevent lawyers from rationalizing improper arguments.
188. See Ted Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar Corporatism: What the S&L
Crisis Means for the Regulation of Lawyers, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 639, 650-69 (1994)
(discussing the limitations of ethics codes in the context of banking practice).
189. E.g., MODEL RULES Rule 1.4.
190. E.g., MODEL RULES Rule 1.4 cmt.; MODEL CODE EC 7-8.
191. William Simon notes that because lawyers usually assume clients wish to
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yers should not be allowed to assume that clients wish to pursue
the maximum economic result; some clients may desire an outcome that is fair to both parties over the best financial result
that they can achieve.
If lawyers are to refrain from making assumptions about their
clients' desire to press all advantages, ethics codes inevitably
must place a premium on substantive communications between
lawyers and their clients. Thomas Shaffer and Stephen Pepper
have long advocated the importance of a "moral dialogue."'92
Although commentators differ on the effects that such a dialogue
can have,' 9 ' most agree that the dialogue should occur.'
Ethics codes typically require lawyers to keep clients informed,
but are opaque regarding the subjects that lawyers and clients
should discuss.' 9'
Shaffer and Pepper encourage the moral dialogue largely in
the hope that clients, as a result, will volunteer to undertake
moral positions in legal matters.' 9 ' I suggest a second, perhaps
maximize their chances of success, they counsel clients from this frame of reference
and help create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Simon, supra note 24, at 53, 58; see also
Freedman, Personal Responsibility, supra note 54, at 200 (cautioning that lawyers
who "assume the worst regarding the client's desires" improperly preempt client
autonomy).
192. Pepper, supra note 56, at 630-32; Shaffer, supra note 24, at 328-29; Thomas
L. Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 231, 231
(1979) (stating that the "moral conversation" between a lawyer and a client is the
beginning and end of a lawyer's professional life).
,193. See Pepper, supra note 56, at 632 ("[Cllient receptivity to the [moral dialogue]
approach will vary with context.").
194. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal
Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1478 (1966)
(discussing a lawyer's obligation to remonstrate with a client who wishes to commit
perjury); Lawry, supra note 15, at 353 (urging moral dialogue); Simon, supra note
24, at 132-33 (advocating dialogue, but assuming that it is anathema to traditional
concepts of legal ethics); cf Arthur Garwin et al., ABA Leadership Forum: Summit
on the Profession, PROF. LAW., Feb. 1994, at 13, 14 (noting that "[clommunication
[with clients] is what seems most difficult for lawyers," but is the most common
reason for complaints to the bar).
195. The Model Rules for example, simply require lawyers to keep clients informed
of the "status of the matter" and to convey sufficient information that clients can
make "informed decisions." MODEL RULES Rule 1.4(a)-(b).
196. Pepper, supra note 56, at 618 (maintaining that the choice of action must
always be the client's); Shaffer, supra note 24, at 329-30. For purposes of the moral
dialogue, one can probably divide the world into three types of clients: those who do
not care about the effect of their lawyers' tactics on others; those who do care; and
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equally important, ramification. By identifying subjects lawyers
must discuss with clients, the codes would force lawyers to confront and elaborate on their own view of the moral issues.'9 7
Having expressed a moral view, lawyers will find it psychologically more difficult to disregard the ethical issues and capitulate
to a client's demands. In other words, requiring lawyers to engage in the moral dialogue would help them separate the requirement of partisanship from their independent duties to give
objective advice and to engage in moral decisionmaking.
What topics should the codes force lawyers to discuss with
clients? Subject to several common-sense limitations, 9 ' five
general subject matters demand particular attention, because
they embody the main contexts in which lawyers tend to abdicate their discretion. First, codes should require lawyers to discuss conduct by clients that may injure third parties. Second,
lawyers should discuss conduct by clients that avoids, or is designed to avoid, legal obligations.' 99 Third, before assuming

those who do not presently care, but might come to care after the effects of the
alternatives are pointed out. Presumably, no amount of discussion will affect the
decisions of the first category of clients, but dialogue may affect clients in the other
two groups. The number of clients within each category is an empirical question
about which there currently is little knowledge.
197. In discussing the relationship between lawyers and clients, Thomas Shaffer
notes that "the way to avoid pretense in advocacy is to say what you mean and to
mean both what you say and what you seem to mean in what you say and do."
Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Profession's Rule Against Vouching for Clients: Advocacy and the "Manner That Is the Man Himself," 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
PoL'Y 145, 169 (1993).
198. Lawyers must be allowed some leeway in timing their disclosures to avoid
emotional reactions from clients. Moreover, there may be occasions when a moral
dialogue may be a flawed means of eliciting true client preferences about tactics; for
example, when clients are upset or are in a vindictive or uncharacteristically solicitous state of mind. On these occasions, the lawyer should be able to postpone the
dialogue or even make the tactical decision based on what she has previously
learned about the client's wishes and orientation. Ideally, the lawyer will have discussed tactics in a general fashion early in the representation, at a time when the
client was relatively free of judgment-clouding influences. See supra notes 192-96 and
accompanying text.
199. Cf. Thomas A. Dye, Creating a Partnership Between Lawyers and Business
Managers for Ethical Action, in PROC. SIXTH ANN. CONF. ON ETHICS IN AM. 310
(Feb. 1995) (arguing that lawyers should, at the outset of each representation, encourage clients to accept their portion of responsibility for creating the problem giving rise to a legal dispute).
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that clients wish them to engage in all tactics that might help
the chances of success, lawyers should discuss tactics that might
injure third parties, delay the proceedings, divert the
decisionmaker from the merits of the cause of action, or have
little chance of success. Fourth, lawyers should discuss with
clients what an objectively "fair" disposition of the case would be
and encourage clients to agree to reach such a disposition. Finally, lawyers should be prepared to discuss with clients the
lawyers' own moral inclinations and any obligations to thirdparty or societal interests that the lawyers believe should be
honored."'
Note what I do not suggest. The codes need not prescribe
particular outcomes nor assume that lawyers can force the "most
moral" decisions upon clients. In Shaffer's terms, lawyers and
clients can only become better persons if they discuss moral
issues as equals.0 1 Likewise, lawyers can only introduce a

200. This conversation of course should include types of zealous advocacy the codes
themselves do not tolerate, including presenting false evidence, lying to the court,
and participating in new wrongdoing. Lawyers perhaps should also discuss those
aspects of the codes that permit lawyers to temper zealousness-pointing out, for
example, that a lawyer might not "press for every advantage."
201. See, e.g., Shaffer, supra note 197, at 172-75 (suggesting that only by engaging
in an honest, collaborative decisionmaking process can the lawyer and the client
strive to become "good persons" in an 'Aristotelian sense"); Shaffer, supra note 192,
at 244-48 (discussing lawyers' roles in facilitating 'moral conversions" of clients); see
also Eberle, supra note 22, at 97-98 (discussing the importance of 'cooperative venture" between lawyer and client in supporting the morality of each); Richard W.
Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and Their Clients, 67 So.
CAL. L. REV. 507, 513-18, 555-70 (1994) (debunking the notion that lawyers can
impose their moral judgment on clients and arguing that lawyers operate as joint
decisionmakers with the clients).
Shaffer notes one element that is essential to meaningful moral discourse: the
client must respect the lawyer's advice. Shaffer, supra note 24, at 328-29. One method of inducing compliance with a lawyer's advice might be to give the lawyer a
"hammer-a means of threatening consequences if the client does not obey. Cf.
Simon, supra note 6, at 1142 n.129 (arguing that allowing lawyers to disclose certain information would give lawyers leverage in convincing clients to act appropriately). That technique, however, resembles extortion more than dialogue. See Freedman,
Ethical Ends, supra note 54, at 56-57 (criticizing the notion that lawyers should be
able to 'blackmail" clients into acting morally); Jamie G. Heller, Note, Legal Counseling in the Administrative State: How To Let the Client Decide, 103 YALE L.J.
2503, 2511, 2515-18 (1994) (discussing tension between models that require lawyers
to let clients decide and models that expect lawyers to strong-arm clients into complying with legal requirements). As an alternative, Shaffer suggests that lawyers can
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measure of objective moral reasoning into their practices if they
confront the moral issues." 2 By requiring lawyers to discuss
the issues in a context in which it is psychologically costly to
appear unconcerned with the issues, the codes can 0encourage
3
lawyers to take the duty of objectivity more seriously.
Similarly, the codes might be more explicit in requiring lawyers to engage in introspection with respect to the employment
of legal tactics that have negative impact on third parties or the
system. Without undermining lawyer zeal, society reasonably
can expect lawyers to consider whether they are obliged to use
particular tactics, the relative harm to the client and third-party
interests in foregoing use of the tactics, whether alternatives
exist to accomplish the same end or to minimize the tactics'
byproducts, how a moral layperson would approach the issue,
and whether systemic interests require lawyers to act differently. Of course, one cannot predict the impact of code provisions
that merely call upon lawyers to reflect.0 4 In large measure,
best achieve results if they engender respect by revealing themselves to be persons
of integrity and the clients' "friends." Shaffer, supra note 24, at 329; see also Zacharias, supra note 73, at 368 (arguing that a lawyer's unwillingness to do all that the
client asks may increase the client's trust in and respect for the lawyer). The relationship Shaffer envisions is more likely when moral discourse begins at the outset
of the representation, before lawyer and client interests come into tension.
202. See, e.g., Postema, supra note 2, at 307, 310 (discussing importance of "reflective capacity" and a "fully engaged and robust faculty of moral judgment"); Susan
Wolf, Ethics, Legal Ethics, and the Ethics of Law, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note
1, at 38, 45 (arguing that a moral lawyer must '[take] seriously the distinction between how the law is used and what it is used for").
203. The labor law duty to "bargain in good faith" provides a useful analogy. See
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988). Requiring good faith bargaining, like requiring a moral
dialogue, does not prevent a party from mouthing words to keep within the letter of
the law, without entertaining any serious interest in discussing the matter. See
Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401, 1438-39
(1958) (observing that the duty to bargain in good faith is easily evaded by those
who never intend to sign a contract); R.W. Fleming, The Obligation to Bargain in
Good Faith, 47 VA. L. REV. 988, 988-989 (1961) (same); Russell A. Smith, The Evolution of the "Duty to Bargain" Concept in American Law, 39 MICH. L. REV. 1065,
1065-67 (1941) (noting that, because it is impossible to look into the minds of the
parties, technical adherence to the legal requirements of bargaining generally satisfies the law). However, the statutory obligation forces its targets at least to focus on
particular subjects and encourages well-intentioned targets to recognize the importance of the issues. See Cox, supra, at 1439 (arguing that bargaining "gradually and
unconsciously transform[s many empty discussions] into bona fide exchanges of
ideas").
204. See Schneyer, supra note 7, at 20 (arguing that "tinkering with ethics rules,
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however, the codes already assume well-intentioned lawyers and
rely upon their introspection,"' without identifying what form
that introspection should take. Clarifying the interests that
lawyers must take into account is one step toward giving meaning to the process of objective lawyer participation in moral
decisionmaking.
C. Publicizing Limits on Client Orientation
Encouraging a dialogue on moral issues between lawyers and
clients should help force lawyers to separate partisanship from
moral decisionmaking. A necessary corollary is that clients must
learn the difference as well. To the extent that clients understand the limits on client orientation, the pressures on lawyers
to abandon objectivity will decrease.0 6 In contrast, absent bet-

or even with lawyers' moral sensibilities" will not counter the economic pressures on
lawyers to unduly favor their clients' interests over others).
Of course, there are small amendments that code drafters could adopt to make
some code provisions more enforceable. For example, to the extent that lawyer violations of trial publicity rules concern the drafters, see supra note 125, the codes could
require lawyers to keep file copies of all publicized statements and to submit them
for random audits. Cf MODEL RULES Rule 7.2(b) (requiring lawyers who advertise to
keep a copy or recording of the advertisement along with a record of when and
where it was used). At root, however, the main constraint on enforcement is the
bars' limited resources, which changes in the rules themselves cannot affect.
205. See Zacharias, supra note 6, at 234; see also Reed E. Loder, Tighter Rules of
Professional Conduct: Saltwater for Thirst?, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 311 (1987) (arguing for greater reliance on introspection-oriented rules).
206. See Shaffer, supra note 24, at 329-30 (arguing that once lawyers and clients
become friends in the sense of knowing each other's limits, they will cease to ask
each other to do what they cannot or will not do).
Sissela Bok suggests that one of the reasons professionals accommodate too
much deception is that the professionals tend to decide the appropriateness of deception, both in individual cases and in the development of professional regulation,
without the benefit of the public's input. In Bok's view:
[Ilf the public were to enter this debate, it is much more likely that we
should see the [central] concerns [about lying] come to the foreground:
concerns for the consequences of a professional practice and on those
engaging in it, their peers, the system of justice and society at large;
concerns for the ways in which such practices spread, and for the added
institutional damage which then results.
BOK, supra note 95, at 162. Bok concludes that public exposure of practices involving lying "would lead to a perception that there are limits to acceptable advocacy."
Id. at 164; cf. Interim Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal
Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 371, 392 (1992) [hereinafter Interim Report] (citing
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ter communication, many clients are likely to assume that efforts by lawyers to introduce objectivity into the decisionmaking
process reflect a lack of professionalism.
What flows from this analysis is that changes in the professional orientation need to be accompanied by publicity, to educate the public regarding the duty of objectivity. In some respects, attitudes towards the bar and the legal system can develop only over a long period of time. The press will attend only direct changes in the rules." 7 Fiction media, which have significant influence on lay attitudes and knowledge, 0 ' are influential only cumulatively.
Nonetheless, some shorter term mechanisms for educating the
public are possible. The bar might undertake a media campaign
and attempt to stimulate local (town hall-type) meetings focusing on lawyers' proper relationship with clients. Perhaps more
importantly, some key pieces of information can be conveyed
meaningfully to clients at the outset of every representation,
including the prescribed limits on zealous advocacy and the
essential duty of lawyers to exercise objective legal judgment.
Clients expect partisanship, but studies have shown that they
can accept limits that are defined in advance." 9 Once clients
become aware of those limits, the lawyer's subsequent task of
discussing particular tactics and issues with clients becomes less
daunting for both participants in the dialogue.1

lawyers' views that clients "seem to want lawyers who take the 'Rambo' approach
and lawyers give in to this pressure").
207. See generally Zacharias, supra note 73, at 374-75 n.106 (discussing authorities
reflecting the media attention focused on the promulgation and adoption of the Model Rules).
208. See Zacharias, supra note 92, at 360-63 (discussing effect of national media
and fictional reporting of lawyer activities on the public's perception of proper lawyer
conduct and, more generally, the bar).
209. See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 73, at 395 (empirical study suggesting that
clients would not trust lawyers if broad exceptions to attorney-client confidentiality
were adopted, but that clients could accept well-defined exceptions).
210. If the need to discuss tactics arises frequently, it can complicate representation
and even increase the client's costs. When a lawyer knows her client is not concerned with negative third-party effects, requiring continued dialogue arguably is
inefficient. However, requiring an initial discussion of tactics at least has the effect
of informing the lawyer of the type of client with whom she is dealing. See supra
note 196.
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Interestingly, some jurisdictions already are moving in this
direction. The New York Court of Appeals, for example, recently
adopted a code requirement for matrimonial cases that lawyers
present clients with a "client bill of rights and obligations" at the
outset of each representation.2 11 Under the scenario envisioned
by the New York court, lawyers must inform clients in writing of
the contours of the contractual attorney-client relationship and
of the clients' obligations to be truthful and cooperative.212 One
could easily expand this procedure more generally to include disclosure of a broader range of information, such as the partisanship a client can expect from his lawyer, the potential limits of
that partisanship, and the client's own role in producing systemically appropriate outcomes.213 This novel, and potentially controversial, approach forces both lawyers and clients to consider
appropriate conduct before the heat of the adversarial battle
skews their perceptions. As a corollary, the bill of rights requirement invites lawyers to exercise their discretionary authority-already guaranteed by most codes-to define and limit
the objectives of the representation in advance in order214 to
accord with the lawyers' sense of fair play.

211. See Statement of Client's Rights and Responsibilities, 22 NYCRR 1400.D (effective Nov. 1, 1993), reprinted in STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION
OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 49-50 (1994); cf. Pye, supra note 80, at 950
("the lawyer should lay out the ground rules that will govern his representation at
his first conference with the [client]"). New York's requirement was adopted upon
the recommendation of a study commission charged with evaluating "lawyer conduct
in matrimonial actions." Jeffery S. Sunshine, Caveat PractitionerEnter the New Matrimonial Rules, 211 N.Y. L.J., Apr. 5, 1994, at 1 (reporting the adoption of the bill
of rights requirement). The New York Court of Appeals has since appointed a new
committee to study extending the bill of rights approach to all types of practice. See
Gary Spencer, Kaye Plans Jury System Reform; Panel Will Launch 'Innovative'
Study, 210 N.Y. L.J., Aug. 26, 1993, at 1 (describing appointment of committee and
Chief Judge Kaye's expectation that the reforms 'fostering communication . . . can
be applied to the corporate bar as well as those who represent individuals.").
212. GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 211, at 50.
213. In the aftermath of the Kaye, Scholer case, some firms are expanding their
"letters of engagement" to clients to define the firms' lawyers' limited obligations and
responsibilities. See Brian W. Smith & M. Lindsay Childress, Avoiding Lawyer Liability in the Wake of Kaye, Scholer, 8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 385, 396-98
(1993) (discussing uses of engagement letters).
214. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(c) ("A lawyer may limit the objectives of the
representation if the client consents after consultation.").
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One significant consequence of the bill of rights approach
deserves mention. .Lawyers' initial communication with clients
often determines the ethical dilemmas that the lawyers later
will confront. Consider, for example, New York's suggestion that
lawyers should inform clients that the clients must tell them
"the truth." For purposes of maximizing advocacy, that advice
may be counterproductive, because it limits the strategies the
lawyer may employ.2 15 Moreover, if the client complies by giving the lawyer truthful information that the lawyer can (or
must) disclose under confidentiality or privilege exceptions,2 16
the lawyer must confront the conflict between personal and
societal interests in disclosure and systemic and client interests
in maintaining secrecy.21 Resolving the conflict may strain the
attorney-client relationship.
On the other hand, suppose that the lawyer does not encourage the client to be truthful.2 1 In some types of representation,
the lawyer's reliance on the client's false statements ultimately
may subject the lawyer to personal liability." 9 Moreover, when

215. At a minimum, the lawyer will not be able to pursue claims or defenses that
would require testimony by the defendant that differs from what the client told the
lawyer. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(a)(4) (requiring lawyers to remedy client perjury
by disclosing confidential information if necessary).
216. Such items may include information regarding certain future crimes, fraud
upon the court, or the source of fee payments into which a grand jury may inquire.
See MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(b) (detailing permissive confidentiality exceptions); id.
Rule 3.3(b) (noting mandatory confidentiality exception in some instances of client
perjury); MODEL CODE DR 4-101(C) (listing confidentiality exceptions); Doe v. United
States (In re Shargel), 742 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding grand jury's inquiry
into fees paid to lawyer); In re Slaughter, 694 F.2d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 1982)
(holding fee information unprivileged).
217. It is precisely to avoid confronting such a conflict that criminal defense lawyers often prefer not to know all the facts that a client may be willing to tell them.
MANN, supra note 56, at 103.
218. Of course, advising a client to withhold information may be tactically suicidal,
because the lawyer risks being surprised later by the information. However, the fear
of surprise is not always present. See generally id. at 103 (study of white-collar
criminal defense attorneys suggesting that lawyers often believe not receiving information from their clients is helpful for the client). In this discussion, I assume that
the lawyer has made a reasonable calculus of the options and determined that she
would rather not know everything.
219. In the Kaye, Scholer case, for example, the government held accountable securities lawyers who negligently accepted their client's version of the facts and misrepresented the client's status on government reporting forms. See supra note 148.
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the lawyer subsequently learns of the client's falsehoods, the
lawyer must deal with difficult ethical issues, including how far
she will go to protect the client,22 ° whether she must withdraw
from the representation,22 ' and whether her withdrawal should
be accompanied by other actions that minimize the damage to
third parties. 2
This example illustrates how requiring lawyers to discuss
lawyer/client rights and obligations forces lawyers to think about
what they are willing to do on behalf of clients in a setting in
which the lawyers can consider their role objectively. It is also
fair to clients; one of the New York Court of Appeals' primary
goals in requiring the bill of rights is to assure respect for client
dignity and autonomy by educating and informing clients.223
With that autonomy comes the responsibility to recognize that
lawyers cannot be expected to respond to all situations without
exercising independent moral judgment.
D. Enforcing the
Objectivity

Requirements of Communication and

I have discussed elsewhere the tension between codes that
prescribe ideal conduct and the dangers of maintaining unenforced, or unenforceable, rules.224 When lawyers' personal and
economic incentives run contrary to the rules, enforcement becomes particularly important to avoid rationalization of improp-

220. The lawyer's options may include disclosing the client's misrepresentations,
withdrawing (noisily or quietly), or continuing to represent the client as if nothing
has happened.
221. See MODEL RULES Rule-1.16(a) (discussing mandatory withdrawal situations);
MODEL CODE DR 2-110(B)(2) (requiring withdrawal if continued representation would
violate the code).
222. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 cmt. (allowing 'noisy" withdrawal when lawyers'
services are used to perpetrate wrongful conduct).
223. Judith Kaye, Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals that adopted the
bill of rights, has characterized "the essence of the lawyer-client reforms" as "better
informing and better communicating with the client." Spencer, supra note 211, at 1;
cf Donna Greene, Westchester Q&A: Justice Sondra Miller; In Search of Fairness in
Divorce Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1993, § 13WC, at 3 (member of study commission explaining that a client aware of fees as they progress has more control over
the decision of when the legal costs are not worth the return).
224. See generally Zacharias, supra note 6, at 251-54, 262-63 (discussing the correlation between a professional rule's specificity and enforceability).
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er conduct by the bar.
A requirement of introspection, by definition, is difficult to
enforce. Disciplinary authorities cannot know what lawyers
"have thought." Upon questioning, lawyers can rationalize most
conduct after the fact.
Not so, however, with respect to the requirement that lawyers
convey the potential limits of partisanship to clients at the start
of representation and to the requirement that they engage in
moral dialogue with clients once questionable conduct arises.
These requirements call for verifiable action by lawyers-to at
least discuss the matters with clients. When questions later
arise, courts and disciplinary authorities can establish that the
lawyer has, or has not, complied by reviewing the lawyers'
memorialization of the conversations or by questioning the client. If lawyers are required to convey some of the information to
clients in writing, as in New York's client bill of rights proposal, 225 proving the conveyance (or nonconveyance) becomes an
easier matter.2 26
Consider, for a moment, a situation in which a lawyer arguably has failed to act objectively: the lawyer allegedly pursued
intrusive discovery for the sole purpose of intimidating a plaintiff27 and the plaintiff has filed a complaint with the bar. Under the current regulatory scheme, the lawyer only needs to
identify a nonfrivolous, tactical reason for the deposition. My
proposals would require more. If, as I have suggested, the codes
are harmonized with Federal Rule 11, the lawyer would need to
demonstrate the absence of improper motivation. Even if the
advocacy rules remain unchanged, however, the lawyer would

225. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 211, at 49-50.
226. Under the New York requirements, clients are expected to sign the bill of
rights to acknowledge that they have received, read, and discussed them. Like all
consent requirements, the bill of rights procedure creates the risk that the review
and discussion of clients' rights will be pro forma, that a client will sign without
understanding the provisions. Thus, the mere fact that a client has signed the instrument probably should not, in and of itself, be sufficient to prove conveyance of
the information. However, for our purposes, it is important to note that the mere
writing of the instrument and the possibility that the lawyer may have to discuss it
will force the lawyer to give some thought to the moral issues the instrument raises.
227. See generally MINTZ, supra note 133, at 194-95 (describing allegedly intimidating tactics in Dalkon Shield class action).
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need to document that she has considered the moral issues,
discussed the limits of advocacy with her client, and discussed
the particular deposition and deposition strategy with the client,
including the appropriateness of harassing or intimidating the
plaintiff.
Would the bar's inquiry into these matters unduly interfere
with attorney-client confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege? As a technical matter, the self-defense exception to the
privilege would exonerate the lawyer's cooperation with the
investigating authorities.22 More significantly, the inquiry
probably would not undermine the client's expectation of secrecy,
for several reasons. First, the substance of the conversations often would not need to be disclosed; in some situations, information that the conversations took place will be sufficient. Second,
any information would be disclosed in confidential proceedings
and therefore could not be used against the client." 9 Third, because the focus of the investigation clearly would be the attorney, the client need not fear that he himself is a target.
Nevertheless, a regime in which lawyers' conversations with
their clients are investigated would introduce a new element of
uncertainty into clients' expectations of secrecy. A similar phenomenon occurred with the adoption of Rule 11, which created

issues of lawyers' "reasonable inquiry" into facts before filing
pleadings and of the lawyers' motives in filing.23 To the extent
228. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 116 cmt.(b) (Tentative
Draft No. 3, 1990) (noting that lawyers may disclose confidential information to protect themselves with respect to disciplinary inquiries and proceedings); cf MODEL
RULES Rule 1.6(b)(2) (allowing a lawyer to disclose confidences when necessary "to
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of
the client"); MODEL CODE DR 4-101(C)(4) (allowing disclosure to defend the lawyer
"against an accusation of wrongful conduct").
229. See Herb Jaffe, Recommendation 7 of the ABA Commission on Evaluation of
Disciplinary Enforcement: The Classic Lawyer v. Client Confrontation, 22 SETON
HALL L. REV. 935, 938 (1992) (noting that more than 30 states follow a procedure
prohibiting public disclosure of bar disciplinary proceedings at least until after a
finding of probable cause that the complaint has merit); see also MODEL RULES FOR
LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, Rule 16 cmt. (1992); Editorial, Open the Process, NA'L L.J., Apr. 25, 1994, at A16 (citing ABA rejection of model rule changes,
thereby reaffirming existing policy calling for open proceedings only after a probable
cause determination).
230. Under Rule 11, a lawyer must certify that her pleadings are well grounded in
fact, based on beliefs "formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances."
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that lawyers must justify their pleadings in a Rule 11 hearing,
they may be required to disclose information clients conveyed 23to1
them and their conversations with clients about the merits.
Unlike in the disciplinary context, these disclosures may take
place in open court and become available for use by the client's
adversary.23 2
What both my proposal and the Rule 11 example reflect, per-

FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1993).

231. For example, if the lawyer relied in part on information that the client conveyed to her, she must reveal that information in order to respond to the allegation
that she had no factual basis for filing a claim. See Robert G. Drummond, Rule 11
Sanctions, 48 MONT. L. REV. 119, 131 (1987) (discussing situations in which a court
or opponent argues that the attorney or client has violated the factual investigation
requirement of Rule 11 and demands evidence of a reasonable factual investigation).
Similarly, the "reasonableness" of a. lawyer's reliance on the client's information (and
therefore the reasonableness of her "inquiry") depends upon the nature of the client,
his relationship to the lawyer, and the nature of the discussions between them. See,
e.g., Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452 (2d Cir. 1988) (requiring separate representation for party and counsel defending against Rule 11 motion);
Paine Webber, Inc. v. Can Am Fin. Group, Ltd., 121 F.R.D. 324 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(involving attorney's attempt to shift blame for Rule 11 violation by telling the court
that his client had lied to him), affd, 885 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Karen
S. Beck, Rule 11 and Its Effect on Attorney Client Relations, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 875,
892 (1992) (finding that in cases in which the court sanctions both an attorney and
client for Rule 11 violations, the attorney and client may each seek to blame the
other for the improper conduct).
232. See Brandt v. Schal Assoc., 121 F.R.D. 368, 385 n.48 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (noting
that the "Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(C)(4) permits a lawyer to
reveal [privileged] matters where the lawyer must defend himself [against] . . . a
Rule 11 claim"); see also Jeffrey N. Cole, Rule 11 Now, LITIG., Spring 1991, at 10,
51 (noting that evidentiary hearings to determine Rule 11 Responsibility can result
in a conflict between attorney and client and that the lawyer, in defending charges
against her, is not constrained by the attorney-client privilege).
Of course, the problem could be alleviated by hearing confidential or privileged
information in camera. However, to the extent that the adversary is a party to the
Rule 11 motion and seeks compensation for damages, he is entitled to cross-examine.
Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2)(A) (1994) (monetary awards are not available to an adversary claiming a frivolous legal argument or to the parties who have settled or
dismissed the action before the court moves on its own initiative to impose sanctions). In camera review of confidential information, even in exceptional situations,
has never seemed like a satisfactory option to proponents of strong confidentiality
principles. Compare Note, Attorney Client Confidentiality: A New Approach, 4
HOFsTRA L. REV. 685 (1976) (urging in camera review procedure for difficult confidentiality issues) with FREEDMAN, supra note 9, at 106 (approving ethics rule authorizing lawyers to refuse court orders that require disclosure of confidential information).
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haps, is that clients too must accept the need to enforce some
nonpartisan, objective actions by lawyers. The intrusion on confidential communications is limited and the confidentiality exception easily explained to clients. The process of explanation-which should occur in advance of any likelihood of disclosure2 3 3 -itself serves the function of educating clients on the
limits of the lawyer's role. The availability of enforceable constraints on lawyers, including the client's adversary, should
contribute to a better client understanding and willingness to
accept the importance of objective, professional conduct.
As the same time, these proposals, though inconsistent with
uncontrolled partisanship, do not contradict the principles of
client dignity and autonomy which Monroe Freedman has fought
so hard to establish. Elsewhere, I have expressed the view that
client "dignity" is respected most when clients are treated as
individuals who can understand moral limitations on attorney
conduct and are informed of those limitations." 4 Informing clients of potential limits on zealous representation, so that clients
can make their own decisions regarding how to act within the
attorney-client relationship, enhances client autonomy.23 5 Lawyers with the deepest respect for client autonomy should be the
most forthcoming in identifying regulatory and moral constraints on their behavior for the clients. Autonomous clients
may continue to pursue repugnant objectives, but they are not
entitled to a lawyer's assistance in this pursuit.

233. See Lee A. Pizzimenti, The Lawyer's Duty To Warn Clients About Limits on
Confidentiality, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 441, 471-89 (1990) (discussing need for lawyers
to describe confidentiality fully); Zacharias, supra note 152, at 931-32, 956 (discussing the importance of accurate communication of confidentiality); cf Zacharias, supra
note 73, at 382 (illustrating the failure of many lawyers to inform their clients
about confidentiality).
234. Zacharias, supra note 73, at 386-88; cf Burke, supra note 93, at 9 (arguing
that clients' "knowledge of the professional and public responsibilities of lawyers,
when coupled with the knowledge that the particular lawyer conforms his personal
and professional conduct to those responsibilities enhances the mutual trust of the
attorney-client relationship").
235. For example, if exceptions to confidentiality exist, a client can only be autonomous if informed of the exceptions, so that he can decide whether he should give
the information to the attorney. Zacharias, supra note 73, at 387; accord Pizzimenti,
supra note 233, at 471; see also Lerman, supra note 99, at 675-744 (analyzing the
effect on clients of absence of candor by lawyers).
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E. Entity Discipline
One implication of the economic incentives discussed above is
that lawyers practicing in a group, such as a law firm, become
subject to peer pressure to engage in profit-maximizing conductY6 Lawyers realize that refraining from questionable acts
on a client's behalf may result in the client hiring another lawyer who will perform the "dirty work. " 7 Firm pressure to retain clients occurs without reference to the merits of a firm
member's conduct in individual cases; she is judged on her total
contribution to the firm coffers. Traditionally, firms treat each
member's ethical conduct as her own business, with the firm
only concerned with the bottom line.
One response to institutional pressures to circumvent objective ethical decisionmaking may be the development of entity
responsibility for some violations of the professional codes. A few
commentators recently have proposed entity responsibility for
separate, practical reasons: in the complex world of modern
practice, it is becoming less realistic to identify individual lawyers as responsible for, or capable of remedying, ethical violations in major litigation. 239 This Article's analysis of profession-

236. The following discussion of entity responsibility focuses on law firms. However,
the concept applies equally to other institutional lawyering contexts in which colleagues affect lawyers' decisionmaking. These contexts may include prosecutorial and
defender organizations, corporate counsel's offices, and public interest organizations.
237. Greenebaum, supra note 157, at 633.
238. See, e.g., CARLIN, supra note 141, at 116 ("The office colleague group affects
lawyers' ethical behavior . . . [bly an informal process of seeking and giving support
for violation among peers in newer offices . . . the constraint of the normative climate in older peer-group offices . . . [and] formal organizational controls in hierarchically structured offices."); Greenebaum, supra note 157, at 632 (discussing the
effect of "group myths and unstated assumptions" on lawyers practicing in a group
context); see also Interim Report, supra note 206, at 392 ("The ever watchful, reporting computers push firm members to compete on hours and fees to the detriment of
service and responsibility."); Gordon, supra note 12, at 35 ("Only when firms are
relatively comfortably entrenched in their markets (and often not even then) will the
more profit-oriented partners, who consider independence a luxury, be likely to tolerate the influence of colleagues with developed political agendas."); cf. Interim Report,
supra note 206, at 298 ("[senior partners] forget to emphasize civility to their employees, because civility doesn't generate fees or increase profits.").
239. This difficulty arises because litigation often is conducted on a "team" basis,
because authority for different aspects of representation is diffused, and because
individual firm members' conduct may be influenced,, or even directed, by members
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alism, however, suggests two additional reasons for an institutional approach to professional discipline. First, it may counteract the institutional pressures upon firm members to maximize
revenues at all costs, by placing partners other than the member-in-charge at risk. Second, it may provoke entity "introspection," by encouraging firms to institute internal mechanisms for
supervising members' conduct (or for responding to members'
concerns).24 At a minimum, firm members would need to discuss their colleagues' ethical dilemmas as if the dilemmas were
their own. This process not only would commit the lawyer in
charge of a case to verbalize her thinking in a context where unthinking responses are embarrassing, but also would provide
input from other lawyers in the same predicament.2 4
The design of entity responsibility is a complicated subject
deserving of a separate article. Not all professional rules are
readily applied against an institution. 2 Expecting a firm to

higher in the firm hierarchy. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law
Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1991) (analyzing entity responsibility); Schneyer,
supra note 142, at 129 (suggesting that special regulation of large law firms may
need to be instituted); Mary Twitchell, The Ethical Dilemmas of Lawyers on Teams,
72 MINN. L. REV. 697, 698-708 (1988) (discussing the effect of working as a team of
lawyers within a firm); Milton R. Wessel, Institutional Responsibility: Professionalism
and Ethics, 60 NEB. L. REV. 504, 511-13 (1981) (discussing law firm responsibility to
clients and society); Zacharias, supra note 92, at 386.
240. A New York bar committee recently proposed not only entity responsibility,
but also a rule making partners "responsible for supervision of each other's work as
well as the work of the associates, and every lawyer's and non-lawyer's work should
be supervised to some degree." Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Discipline of
Law Firms, 48 REC. ASSN B. CITY N.Y. 628, 638 (1993) [hereinafter Discipline of
Law Firms]; see also Anthony E. Davis, Professional Discipline of Law Firms-The
Emperor Needs New Clothes, PROF. LAW. Nov. 1994, at 1 (discussing the New York
proposal). As discussed below, I question whether this blanket rule adequately accounts for the realities of everyday practice. See infra note 243. However, law firm
responsibility would require firms to consider management steps to address professional responsibility issues, just as the development of conflict of interest rules and
disqualification motions has forced firms to establish mechanisms to screen conflicts
prior to each representation.
241. Lawyers intimately involved in legal projects tend to have psychological difficulty perceiving ethical dilemmas. See Langevoort, supra note 4, at 102-03, 105.
Involving lawyers who are less invested in the project may help counteract their
myopia. See id. at 105, 113-14 (discussing advantages of rotating lawyers in major
cases).
242. Some categories of professional rules, such as the limitations on advertising
and prohibitions against referral fees and conflicts of interests, are clearly equally
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supervise all decisions made by its members also may be unrealistic.2" Perhaps most importantly, entity responsibility means
little unless accompanied by changes in the tools of discipline,
because disciplinary authorities are unlikely to impose draconian sanctions (such as suspension or disbarment) on entire
firms.2" The very concept of firm liability probably assumes
the availability of authority to impose fines, an authority which
itself requires careful definition.24 5
For purposes of this Article, it suffices to note the role that
entity responsibility can play in counteracting institutional and
relational pressures upon lawyers to avoid objective
decisionmaking. As bar associations begin to address entity
responsibility,2 46 its potential for provoking intra-firm discussions of ethical issues should not be overlooked.247

applicable to law firm conduct. Others, particularly those addressing personal decorum, seem more individualistic. Most rules that raise issues of lawyer "objectivity" at
least initially address the individual lawyer's choice of objectives and tactics, but
these could be broadened to encompass law firm involvement in the individual's
choices.
243. The codes already impose some responsibility upon lawyers to supervise others
in their firm. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rules 5.1-5.2 (defining responsibilities of supervisory and subordinate attorneys); Irwin D. Miller, Preventing Misconduct by Promoting the Ethics of Attorneys' Supervisory Duties, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 259, 274-304
(1994) (discussing and proposing more enforcement of rules imposing supervisory
duties on law firm partners). Some formulations of entity responsibility envision fullscale supervision of all partners' activities. To the extent that these proposals envision joint responsibility for all partners' legal work, they duplicate unnecessarily
and inevitably increase clients' costs. See Langevoort, supra note 4, at 113-14
(discussing prohibitive expense of rotating lawyers involved in a case in order to
prevent ethical breaches). The very principle of objectivity assumes that individual
lawyers can be trusted to make some reasonable ethical decisions.
244. See Discipline of Law Firms, supra note 240, at 635 ("[A] firm cannot be disbarred, and we find it difficult to conceive of a situation in which an entire firm as
an entity should be suspended from the practice of law.").
245. Arguably the functions of discipline include remedying client harm, deterring
similar misconduct by the firm in the future, and deterring other firms. Each of
these functions would call for radically different levels of fining. Thus, the grant of
fining authority to a disciplinary agency should be accompanied by guidelines that
identify the approach the agency should take in imposing monetary sanctions. Cf.
Miller, supra note 243, at 315 (discussing the need for, and potential uses of, flexible authority to fine entities).
246. See, e.g., Discipline of Law Firms, supra note 240.
247. Intra-firm discussions of this type may be particularly enlightening for older
practitioners, who were educated before the adoption of the Model Code and Model
Rules and before law schools began to teach, or require, professional responsibility
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F. Training the Bar
The custom of nearly absolute client orientation has developed
over a long period of time, in response to historical developments
and the failings of prevailing legal ethics that Monroe Freedmen
highlighted."4 A change in that custom can only be produced
over a similar period, with a catalyst that counteracts the lessons the bar has learned. In other words, the bar needs a reeducation-starting in law schools,249 but also for the practicing bar that is responsible for mentoring and transferring a
professional ethos to new lawyers.250
Susan Koniak has illustrated how the bar often attempts to
use professional regulation to establish its own "vision" of law,
to argue that standard moral and legal principles do not apply
equally to the profession." 1 Recent developments suggest that
other actors in the system do not simply acquiesce. The Kaye,
Scholer case, for example, has made lawyers take special note of
the applicability of criminal and regulatory requirements to
them.25 2 Judicial enforcement of Rule 11 challenges the

courses. These practitioners often have not had an opportunity to consider the dilemmas discussed in this Article in a context uncharged by the pressures of litigation and partisanship.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 35-55.
249. See Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, On Teaching Professional Judgment, 69
WASH. L. REV. 527, 530-32 (1994) (arguing generally that legal education should
avoid focusing on skills to the exclusion of helping students learn to exercise professional judgment).
250. See Nancy J. Moore, The Usefulness of Ethical Codes, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L.
7, 18 (arguing that "intense educational effort" is needed to help lawyers understand
their legal obligations and ethical principles); David A. Richards, Moral Theory, the
Developmental Psychology of Ethical Autonomy and Professionalism, 31 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 359, 361 (1981) (arguing that lawyers need ongoing moral education in the
ethics of their profession to avoid equating professional ethics with misguided loyalty
to clients); cf Shuchman, supra note 91, at 129-31 (discussing limits of education
and suggesting that educational efforts be calculated to encourage lawyers to disclose
their approaches to ethics issues and thereby to create an "open market in legal ethics").
251. See Koniak, supra note 184, at 1396-98 (arguing that code drafters and disciplinary authorities have attempted to supplement and to trump substantive law
that diverges from their "vision" of the lawyer's appropriate role).
252. In Kaye, Scholer, the Office of Thrift Supervision argued that lawyers who
perceived themselves as advocates for banks complying with administrative reporting
requirements were themselves responsible for misleading disclosures. James Podgers,
Changing the Rules, 78 A.B.A. J. 53 (1992) (describing OTS position); Attorneys Can't
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profession's dominant vision of advocacy." 3 The federal
government's increasing practice of subpoenaing attorneys25 4
and seizing attorneys' fees 5 has forced lawyers to question
their traditional methods of representing clients.
These developments suggest that the time is ripe to begin a
process of debate and renewed discussion of lawyers' proper role.
Academia has done its part, drawing attention to the oversimplification of the bar's dominant vision and its anomalies. Because

Claim Privilege as Agents of Their Clients, OTS' Chief Counsel Argues, BANKING
ATTY (BNA), May 25, 1992, at 5; OTS Chief Counsel Defends Action Against Kaye
Scholer, 8 LAWS. MAN. PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 77 (1992) (OTS counsel describing OTS position). The large settlement OTS extracted from the Kaye, Scholer firm
has forced all lawyers representing clients in regulated industries to reconsider their
role. See Zacharias, supra note 92, at 368-69 (discussing effect of Kaye, Scholer on
lawyers' vision of their role); cf Kirk A. Swanson, Debate Continues on Ethics After
Kaye, Scholer Accord, 8 LAWS. MAN. PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 109 (1992) (debating OTS position); ABA, OTS Square Off on Lawyer Liability, 8 LAWS. MAN. PROF.
CONDUCT (ABAIBNA) 264 (1992) (same). One point the Kaye, Scholer settlement
brings home is that compliance with ethical codes does not immunize lawyers from
other sanctions for their behavior, including criminal and civil liability. Legal commentators have highlighted this reality, but practicing lawyers often overlook, or
forget, it. See Zacharias, supra note 6, at 251-55 (discussing relationship between
ethics codes and extra-code constraints).
253. See Zacharias, supra note 92, at 367-68 (discussing the tension between Rule
11 and traditional professional rules regarding advocacy and illustrating how implementation of Rule 11 has influenced lawyers' views of their own roles).
254. Lawyers who involve themselves in client activities or receive information that
is potentially unprivileged now face a realistic possibility of being subpoenaed. This
possibility means both that lawyers must be more cautious when putting themselves
in that position and that they must explain the possibility of being subpoenaed (and
its potential effect on the attorney-client relationship) to clients. In addition, the
possibility may make some criminal defense attorneys hesitate to accept cases in
which the likelihood of being subpoenaed is high. See generally Zacharias, supra note
152, at 920-22, 931-35 (discussing attorney subpoenas and their effect on the representation of clients).
255. See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: The Impact of
RICO and CCE Forfeitures on the Right to Counsel, 72 VA. L. REV. 493, 495-97
(1986) (arguing the unconstitutionality of fee seizures, in part, because of their effect
on the willingness of defense attorneys to accept cases); Morgan Cloud, Forfeiting
Defense Attorneys' Fees: Applying an Institution Role Model Theory to Define Individual Constitutional Rights, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 1 (arguing that defendants' right to
counsel should be determined with a view to the defense bar's willingness to accept
cases when faced with the possibility of fee seizure); William J. Genego, The New
Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 781, 815-19 (empirical study suggesting that the
threat of seizure of attorney fees has caused criminal defense lawyers to cease representing clients in particular categories of cases) and authorities cited id. at 784 n.6.
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the vision is being challenged in practice, in a way that targets
lawyers' pocketbooks, as in Kaye, Scholer,2 55 lawyers have little
choice but to listen and engage the issues." 7 The ongoing project to restate the "law governing lawyers"2 5 is one aspect of
the education process, because it will spur lawyers to recognize
the many constraints on their partisanship that the codes and
the traditional "vision" of the bar have not acknowledged. At a
minimum, the project will demonstrate that criminal law,25 9
malpractice, and evidence principles,"' among others, undermine the continued viability of partisanship without objective
deliberation.
In the aftermath of Kaye, Scholer, law firms and insurers are
seeking strategies for reconciling their responsibilities with
traditional client-oriented advocacy.26 ' It is therefore an ap256. In Kaye, Scholer, the government claimed that the law firm in question was
liable for all $275 million of damage caused by its client's misrepresentations, froze
all the assets of the law firm, and thereby forced the firm to settle for $41 million.
See In re Fishbein, OTS AP-92-19 (Dep't Treasury 1992), cited in Curtis, supra note
148, at 988, 1000; Office of Thrift Supervision, OTS, Kaye, Scholer Agree to Settle
All Charges, OTS NEWS 92-95, Mar. 8, 1992. Other types of governmental action
against lawyers, including seeking forfeiture of attorneys' fees under federal statutes
and seeking to disqualify defense lawyers by calling them as witnesses, may have
similar financial ramifications for the lawyers' practices. See discussion and authorities cited supra notes 255-56.
257. This reality is highlighted by the unprecedented attention-in writings, symposia, and CLE programs-that is being focused on the effects on traditional practice
of Kaye, Scholer, seizures of attorneys' fees, and subpoenas directed to attorneys.
258. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1990);
see also Symposium, The Evolving Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 46
OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1993) (focusing on selected professional responsibility issues raised
by the proposed Restatement).
259. Examples include securities regulation and laws directed at conspiracies and
aiding and abetting.
260. Perhaps the most significant evidentiary determinant of lawyer behavior is the
attorney-client privilege. Compare CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 1994)
(requiring a lawyer "to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client") with CAL. EVID. CODE §
956.5 (West 1994) (classifying as unprivileged "[information] necessary to prevent the
client from committing a criminal act that . . . is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm"). See Zacharias, supra note 86, at 369-73 (discussing relationship between attorney-client privilege and attorney-client confidentiality rules).
261. See Mary C. Daly, Lawyering After Kaye, Scholer: Preventing the Problems
Before They Arise, in THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AFTER Kaye, Scholer (PLI
Corp. Law & Practice Handbook Series No. B4-7009, 1992) (practitioner's guide to
Kaye, Scholer); Smith & Childress, supra note 213 (same); Anthony E. Davis, The
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propriate time to ask lawyers to question their own assumptions. The process of introducing initiatives into the codes that
support the concept of professional objectivity and of developing
continuing legal education programs that confront the bar's
oversimplified vision go hand in hand." 2 Both are necessary
stimuli for a debate that must precede a change in custom in the
practice of law.
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to view professionalism from a
new perspective. Contrary to the view that client-oriented legal
ethics codes deprive lawyers of the discretion to act morally, it
suggests that the codes leave ample room for objective
decisionmaking and objective conduct. Over time, however, personal and economic incentives have led lawyers to misinterpret
the spirit of the codes. Lost is the notion that professionalism
includes a component of objectivity in the practice of law.
The codes can be strengthened, to counteract lawyers' tendency to surrender their independence. But the root of the problem
lies not in the codes, but in the ethos of the guild.26 Most
ethicists recognize that moral behavior is, by definition, voluntary.2" Although the codes may provide guidelines and encour-

Long Term Implications of the Kaye, Scholer Case for Law Firm Management-Risk
Management Comes of Age, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 677, 681-87 (1994) (discussing
strategies for firm management of the risk of potential liability for ethics violations);
cf Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyer Liability in Third Party Situations: The Meaning
of the Kaye, Scholer Case, 26 AKRON L. REV. 395, 397-98 (1993) (discussing practical
implications of Kaye, Scholer); Jackson, supra note 143, at 1070-71 (discussing effect
of Kaye, Scholer on the availability of insurance).
262. Because casebooks and professional responsibility "readers" have already
identified many of the ethical scenarios with which lawyers must deal and have
collated resources discussing these scenarios, development of courses and programs
should not be difficult. The available casebooks are to numerous too list. In addition,
several commentators recently have produced "readers" that also identify the core
scenarios that lawyers need to consider. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS (1990); HOWARD LESNICK, BEING A LAWYER (1992);
JAMES E. MOLITERNO & JOHN M. LEVY, ETHICS OF THE LAWYER'S WORK (1993).
263. Cf Lawry, supra note 15, at 363 (arguing that reform of ethics codes "is a
secondary challenge to the task of getting the central idea of lawyering straight to
begin with").
264. See, e.g., Eberle, supra note 22, at 108-09 (depicting lawyer as "autonomous"
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age lawyers to exercise objective decisionmaking, any change in
the prevailing ethos must come from lawyers themselves. Only
through reeducation of both lawyers and clients regarding the
meaning of professionalism can the profession regain a more
balanced view of its proper role.

moral agent); Postema, supra note 2, at 287 (arguing that lawyers cannot avoid
responsibility for actions by referring to the system, without considering morality);
Richards, supra note 14, at 360 (analyzing lawyers' moral developments).

